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Abstract 
Developing countries are increasingly concerned about improving country competitiveness and productivity, as they 
face the increasing pressures of globalization and attempt to improve economic growth and reduce poverty. Among 
such countries, Investment Climate Assessments (ICA) surveys at the firm level, have become the standard way for the 
World Bank to identify key obstacles to country competitiveness, in order to prioritize policy reforms for enhancing 
competitiveness. Given the surveys objectives and the nature and limitations of the data collected, this paper discusses 
the advantages and disadvantages of using different productivity measures. The main objective is to develop a 
methodology to estimate, in a consistent manner, the productivity impact of the investment climate variables. The 
paper applies it to the data collected for ICAs in four countries: Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. 
Observations on logarithms (logs) of the variables are pooled across three countries (Guatemala, Honduras and 
Nicaragua). Endogeneity of the production function inputs and of the investment climate variables is addressed by 
using a variant of the control function approach, based on individual firm information, and by aggregating investment 
climate variables by industry and region. It is shown that it is possible to get robust results for 10 different productivity 
measures. The estimates for the four countries show how relevant the investment climate variables are to explain the 
average level of productivity. IC variables in several categories (red tape, corruption and crime, infrastructure and, 
quality and innovation) account for over 30 percent of average productivity. The policy implications are clear: 
investment climate matters and the relative impact of the various investment climate variables indicate where reform 
efforts should be directed in each country. It is argued that this methodology can be used as a benchmark to assess 
productivity effects in other ICA surveys. This is important because ICA surveys are available now for more than 65 
developing countries. 
JEL Clasification: D24, L60, O54, C01. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As developing countries face the pressures and impacts of globalization, they are 
seeking ways to stimulate growth and employment within this context of increased 
openness. With most of these countries having secured a reasonable level of 
macroeconomic stability, they are now focusing on issues of competitiveness and 
productivity through microeconomic reform programs. From South East Asia to Latin 
America, countries are reformulating their strategies and making increased 
competitiveness a key priority of government programs. 
A significant component of country competitiveness is having a good investment 
climate or business environment. The investment climate, as defined in the World 
Development Report (2005), is “the set of location-specific factors shaping the 
opportunities and incentives for firms to invest productively, create jobs and expand.” It 
is now well accepted and documented, conceptually and empirically, that the scope and 
nature of regulations on economic activity and factor markets - the so-called investment 
climate and business environment - can significantly and adversely impact productivity, 
growth and economic activity (see Bosworth and Collins, 2003; Dollar et al., 2004; 
Rodrik and Subramanian, 2004; Loayza, Oviedo and Serven, 2004; McMillan, 1998 and 
2004; OECD, 2001; Wilkinson, 2001; Alexander et al., 2004; Djankov et al., 2002; 
Haltiwanger, 2002; He et al., 2003; World Bank, 2003; and World Bank, 2004 a,b). 
Prescott (1998) and Parente and Prescott (2002) argue that to understand large 
international income differences, it is necessary to explain differences in productivity 
(TFP). His main candidate to explain those gaps is the resistance to the adoption of new 
technologies and to the efficient use of current operating technologies, which in turn are 
conditioned by the institutional and policy arrangements a society employs (investment 
climate variables). Recently, Cole et al. (2004) also have argued that Latin America has 
not replicated Western economic success due to the productivity (TFP) gap. They point 
to competitive barriers (investment climate variables in our analysis) as the promising 
channels for understanding the low productivity observed in Latin American countries.  
Figures 1a to 1c plot the evolution of the GDP-per capita, of labor productivity and 
labor force participation in Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, relative to 
the values of the US. Since the relative labor force participation of each country is stable 
since 1975, the decline in GDP per capita is mainly due to the observed decline in labor 
productivity, indicating that the gap in both series, relative to the US, is increasing 
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through time (divergence). Therefore, it is clear that these countries have a serious 
productivity problem. In this paper we want to study the elements related to the 
investment climate of those three Caribbean countries in order to identify the 
bottlenecks for productivity growth in the areas of; infrastructure, red tape and 
corruption and crime, finance and corporate governance and, quality, innovation and 
labor skills.    
Government policies and behavior exert a strong influence on the investment climate 
through their impact on costs, risks and barriers to competition. Key factors affecting 
the investment climate through their impact on costs are: corruption, taxes, the 
regulatory burden and extent of red tape in general, input markets regulation (labor and 
capital), the quality of infrastructure, technological and innovation support, and the 
availability and cost of finance. 
For example, Kasper (2002) shows that poorly understood “state paternalism” has 
usually created unjustified barriers to entrepreneurial activity, resulting in poor growth 
and a stifling environment. Kerr (2002), shows that a quagmire of regulation which is 
all too common, is a massive deterrent to investment and economic growth. As a case in 
point, McMillan (1988) argues that obtrusive government regulation before 1984 was 
the key issue in New Zealand’s slide in the world per-capita income rankings. Hernando 
de Soto (2002) describes one key adverse effect of significant business regulation and 
weak property rights: with costly firm regulations, fewer firms choose to register and 
more become informal. Also, if there are high transaction costs involved in registering 
property, assets are less likely to be officially recorded, and therefore cannot be used as 
collateral to obtain loans, thereby becoming “dead” capital. 
Likewise, poor infrastructure and limited transport and trade services increase logistics 
costs, rendering otherwise competitive products uncompetitive, as well as limiting rural 
production and people’s access to markets, which adversely affects poverty and 
economic activity (Guasch, 2004).  
The pursuit of greater competitiveness and a better investment climate is leading 
countries -often assisted by multilaterals such as the World Bank - to undertake their 
own studies to identify the principal bottlenecks in terms of competitiveness and the 
investment climate, and to evaluate the impact these have, to set priorities for 
intervention and reform. The most common instrument used has been firm-level 
surveys, known as Investment Climate surveys (ICs), from which both subjective 
evaluations of obstacles and objective hard-data numbers with direct links to costs and 
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productivity are elicited and imputed. Such surveys collect data at firm level on the 
following themes: infrastructure, bureaucracy and corruption, technology and quality, 
human capital, corporate governance, crime and security, and financial services.  
While the ICs are quite useful in identifying major issues and bottlenecks as perceived 
by firms, the data collected is also meant to provide a quantitative assessment of the 
impact or contribution of the investment climate (IC) variables on productivity. In turn, 
that quantified impact is used in the advocacy for, and design of, investment-climate 
reform. Yet providing reliable and robust estimates of productivity estimates of the IC 
variables from the surveys is not a straightforward task. First, ICs do not provide 
balance panel-type data on all the variables. Second, the production function is not 
observed; and third, there is an identification issue separating Total Factor Productivity 
(TFP) from the production function inputs. When any of the production function inputs 
is influenced by common causes affecting productivity, like IC variables or other plant 
characteristics, there is a simultaneous equation problem. In general, one should expect 
the productivity to be correlated with the production function inputs and, therefore, 
inputs should be treated as endogenous regressors when estimating production 
functions. This demands special care in the econometric specification for estimating 
those productivity effects and in the choice of the most appropriate way of measuring 
productivity.  
There is an extensive literature discussing the advantages and disadvantages of using 
different statistical estimation techniques and/or growth accounting (index number) 
techniques to estimate productivity or Total Factor Productivity in levels (TFP) or in 
rates of growth (TFPG). For overviews of different productivity concepts and 
aggregation alternatives see, for example, Solow (1957), Jorgenson, Gollop and 
Fraumeni (1987), Hall (1990), Olley and Pakes (1996),  Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan 
(1998),  Batelsman and Doms (2000), Hulten (2001), Diewert and Nakamura (2002), 
Jorgenson (2003), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) and Van Biesebroeck (2007).  
In this paper we discuss the applicability of some of these techniques to the problem at 
hand and present adaptations and adjustments that provide a best fit for the described 
objective: estimating robust productivity impact of IC variables collected through firm-
level surveys across countries; investment climate surveys. 
The development of a consistent econometric methodology to be used in most 
developing countries as a benchmark for evaluating the impact of IC variables on 
productivity at the firm level is the main objective of this paper. To illustrate its 
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applicability and usefulness, the methodology is used to assess the productivity impact 
in four different countries, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, with the 
ICs data collected for 2001 and 2002 (Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua) and 2002, 
2003 and 2004 (Costa Rica). 
Using a common productivity methodology is essential for benchmarking and for cross 
country comparisons of the empirical results. This methodology is intended to give 
robust empirical results and aims at explaining the reasons why different research 
groups addressing common issues might reach opposite conclusions, even sharing the 
same data set. At the same time, in support of diversity and cross fertilization, having 
alternative econometric approaches should help identifying limitations, advantages or 
disadvantages of each approach. Those productivity results that are robust to different 
approaches should play a key role in the formulation of clear policy recommendations 
for developing countries. This robust econometric approach can be justified using the 
statistical sensitivity analysis discussed in Magnus and Vasnev (2007).  
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the concepts of productivity 
and discusses general productivity measures based on levels versus differences. We 
conclude that, given the fixed effect nature of IC variables obtained form ICs, it is better 
to analyze productivity in levels (or log-levels) rather than rates of growth of 
productivity. This section also introduces a consistent econometric methodology for the 
selection of IC and firm explanatory variables for different productivity measures. This 
econometric strategy is applied to study the investment climate determinants of 
productivity in Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. Section 3, describes in 
detail the estimation issues and presents the results. This section also suggests 
evaluating the country specific contribution of IC variables to average productivity, if 
we have estimated common elasticities by pooling the data from several countries. 
Section 4 compares our empirical results with the results form using other methods 
suggested in the literature to estimate production functions. Finally, section 5 presents a 
summary of the econometric methodology and of the main conclusions. All the figures 
and tables with the definitions of the variables used and with the panel data estimation 
results are included in the appendix. 
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1 Productivity and Total Factor Productivity Measures for the 
Analysis of the Productivity Impact of Investment Climate (IC) 
Variables 
The econometric methodologies discussed in this paper are applied to study the 
productivity determinants of variables collected at the firm level. In particular, we 
consider the impact of investment climate (IC) variables and other firm control variables 
(C) on several productivity measures. We classify the IC variables into four broad 
categories: i) infrastructure, ii) red tape, corruption and crime, iii) finance and corporate 
governance and iv) quality, innovation and labor skills; see Tables 3a to 3d of the 
appendix.  
Productivity (P), or multifactor productivity, refers to the effects of any variable 
different from the inputs --labor (L), intermediate materials (M) and capital services 
(K)--, affecting the production (sales) process. To be more specific, consider that the 
production function Q=F(L,M,K, α) and the productivity (Pit) equation of the firm (i) at 
period (t) are given by: 
 
,( , , , )it it it it F it itY F L M K Pα=                                                 (1a) 
Pit = G(ICit, Cit, αIC.it) exp(uit)                                                   (1b) 
 
where uit is a random error term with properties that will be specified later on. The 
individual firms are indicated by the sub-index i = 1, 2, ..., N, where N is the total 
number of firms in the sample and by the sub-index time t = 1, 2, ..., T, where T is the 
total number of years in the sample. In the IC surveys, N is large and T is small.  
When any of the input variables (L, M and K) is influenced by common causes affecting 
productivity, like IC variables or other firm characteristic variables (C), we have a 
simultaneous equation problem. (See Marschak and Andews, 1944, and Griliches and 
Mairesse, 1995). In general, we should expect productivity to be correlated with the 
inputs L, M and K, and therefore the inputs must be treated as endogenous regressors 
when estimating production functions. Blundell and Bond (2000) discuss a solution, 
System-GMM, to this endogenous regressors problem based on a generalized method of 
moments (GMM) approach, applied to persistent panel data. Olley and Pakes (1996), 
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Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and Akerberg, Caves and Frazer (2007) suggest structural 
approaches to estimate production functions.  
A specific solution to this endogeneity problem of the inputs L, M and K in (1a) will be 
presented in section 2.2 when estimation issues of production functions are discussed. 
Taking logarithms in (1a) and (1b), 
 
log log logit it itY Q P= +                                                                (2a) 
                 logPit = log G(ICit, Cit) + uit                                                           (2b) 
 
where log P is the “residual” from equation (2a) and log Q = log F(L,M,K). That is, the 
log of productivity (P) is the difference between the logarithm of output (Log Y) and the 
logarithm of aggregate input (log Q) formed by L, M and K. Differentiating (2a) and 
(2b) we get similar expressions for the rates of growth: 
 
log log logit it itd Y d Q d P= +                                                            (3a) 
                 dlogPit = dlogG(ICit, Cit) + duit .                                                          (3b) 
 
From equations (3a) and (3b) it is clear that we would like to be able to assign to dlogPit 
all those changes different than Lit, Mit and Kit, that shift the production function of firm 
i in period t, while associating the movements along the production function with 
changes in the aggregate input
2
, dlogQit.  
                                                 
2
 Consider the extended production function Yit = F(Lit,Mit,Kit, Pit), where Pit is an aggregate productivity 
index which incorporates technological changes, recent innovations, etc., in the production of Yit. In this 
general specification, any improvement in Pit , perhaps due to improvements in IC conditions, represents 
a movement along the production function as well as a shift of the production function.  
log log log log
log .it it it itit it it it it
it it it it
F F F F
d Y dL dM dK dP
L M K P
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= + + +
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
   
If the “residual” or the weighted rate of growth of Pit , which is ,
log
logit it P it it
it
F
dP d P
P
α
∂
=
∂
, has 
elasticity , 1P itα =  then dlogPit=dlogTFPit , where TFP refers to the Total Factor Productivity. However, 
when the separability conditions (Hicks neutral technical, etc.) are not satisfied, see Jorgenson, Gollop 
and Fraumeni (1987),  what we are measuring by the “residual” is the rate of growth of productivity as a 
time varying weighted rate of growth of Pit and this might not be equal to the rate of growth of TFP. As 
we will see in the empirical section, those conditions are difficult to satisfy in most countries. So we call 
the “residual” productivity (P) and not TFP. Our productivity (P) concept is sometimes called multifactor 
productivity. 
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The next step is to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of using alternative 
measures of productivity for the evaluation of the impact of IC variables on 
productivity. From the above discussion is clear that we have two general approaches to 
measure productivity (P): a) based on the rate of growth of productivity or b) based on 
the level (or logs) of productivity. 
From equations (3a) and (3b) and the comment of footnote 3 we can write (2a) and (2b) 
in term of their rates of growth
3
 as: 
 
, , ,log log log log logit L it it M it it K it it itd Y d L d M d K d Pα α α= + + +                                    (4a) 
, ,log log logit IC it it C it it itd P d IC d C duα α= + +                                                                (4b) 
 
where the coefficients of equation
4
 (4a) αj,it are the heterogeneous and time varying j-
input-elasticities of the aggregate input Q, j = L, M, and K, of firm (i) in period (t). 
Which of the two approaches, a)  or b), is more convenient to evaluate the impact of IC 
variables on productivity based on ICA surveys?  
At first glance, the procedure based on productivity growth seems to be more general 
and more convenient because it does not require us to specify a particular functional 
form of the production function F(L,M,K). However, it has serious drawbacks arising 
from the quality of the data (measurement errors and missing firm observations from 
one year to the next). The common drawbacks of estimating equation in rates of growth 
are: 
(i) Measurement errors are enhanced by taking first differences, 
(ii) When the inputs are not strictly exogenous (or “exogenous”) the standard 
simultaneous equation problems imply and least square estimators are 
inconsistent and biased. The most common solution requires the use of 
GMM estimators or instrumental variable (IV) estimators. However, 
equations with variables in differences suffer from the weak instruments 
problem which produces very poor parameter estimates (Chamberlain, 1982; 
Griliches and Mairesse, 1995). Recently, Blundell and Bond (2000) have 
                                                 
3
 Notice that we are assuming that IC and C variables are scalar and not vectors. At this point this is done 
to simplify the notation.  Later on and also in the empirical application we will consider both as vectors.  
4
 The coefficients of (4b) are also elasticities and are defined in a similar way. 
 12
proposed an alternative GMM estimator for variables that are slow mean 
reverting (persistent). 
(iii) We only have information on IC variables for a single year. Therfore, if we 
compute rates of growth we lose all the unobservable fixed effects but also 
all the IC variables.  
 
In order to estimate productivity growth based on equation (4a) we have to take two 
important decisions: 
First. We have to approximate the continuous transformation of the variables, say 
dlog(Yit), by a discrete approximation based on first differences, say ∆log(Yit) = 
log(Yi,t)-log(Yi,t-1). This last approximation requires transforming (4a,) using the 
Tornqvist
5
 (1936) index:  
 
, , ,log log log log logit L it it M it it K it it itY L M K Pα α α∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆                                    (5) 
where , , , , , , 1
1
( )
2
j i t j i t j i tα α α −= +  is average input-output elasticity of input j of firm i 
during the last two years (t and t-1) where j = Lit, Mit and Kit.  
Second. Since the heterogeneous and time varying input-output elasticities αj,it are 
unknown they can be measured by nonparametric procedures, index number techniques 
(see Solow 1957, Diewert and Nakamura 2002) or estimated by regression techniques, 
assuming that the input-output elasticity parameters are constant in some sense. In this 
paper, we will consider two possibilities: constant input-output elasticities by industry 
pooling and not pooling across countries, and constant elasticity parameters at the 
aggregate level pooling and not pooling countries.  
To understand why the characteristics of World Bank investment climate surveys (ICs) 
favor the productivity analysis done in levels, we describe now the main ICs properties 
of these four Central America countries. 
                                                 
5
 Jorgenson and Griliches (1967), among others, suggested to use this Tornqvist index as an approximation to 
the continuous Divisia index. 
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1.1 Description of the Data 
The data base of each country is a short unbalanced panel with temporal observations of 
most variables for 2001 and 2002 (T=2) in Guatemala Honduras, and Nicaragua and 
2002, 2003 and 2004 (T=3) in Costa Rica. However, for the IC variables, which are 
listed in Tables 3a to 3d of the appendix, we have observations only for the year 2002 in 
Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua and for the year 2004 for Costa Rica.  
This raises the first question: should we only use cross-section data (say only for 2002 
for the pool of countries and 2004 for Costa Rica) or, should we also use the recall data 
from the previous one or two years, even if we do not have information on the IC 
variables for those years? We assume that, unless there is an important structural break 
in the preceding, the IC variables at the firm level should not change much from one 
year to the next. In fact, what can change from one year to the next is the reaction of the 
firm facing a certain investment climate, but it requires time for the firm to implement 
the corresponding adjustments. Therefore, for each plant we repeat the values observed 
of each IC variable for the three years (observable fixed effects). 
We are interested in keeping as many observations as possible to benefit from the law of 
large numbers and the central limit theorems. Hence, we suggest pooling observations 
across Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua while treating separately Costa Rica
6
 This 
is important because our observations are very unevenly distributed through time and 
across firms, precluding us from doing separate country analyses of each industry or 
sector. (See Table 4 of the appendix.) For example, if we conduct an industry analysis 
country by country, we will end up having in the textile sector of Honduras only nine 
observations, while if we pool the observations across the three countries we have at 
least 38 observations, giving more reliable statistical results.  
In 2001, after pooling the observations across the three countries, we only have 440 
observations while for 2002 we have 1,020 observations. Therefore, if we measure 
productivity in rates of growth we will end up with at most 440 firms, which is a very 
small sample size to study differences by industry and by country. However, doing the 
                                                 
6
 Some other World Bank studies, see for example Haltiwanger and Schweiger (2005) take an alternative 
approach. They selected a very large pool of countries (say 30 countries) and estimate only a cross 
section. However, by doing that cross country analysis at the firm level, we generally loose a lot of firms 
from the sample because we do not have a large common set of IC variables for very different countries. 
This approach suffer important sample representation issues or sample selection biases. We believe that 
selecting a small group of countries with similar number of responses to the questions of the ICA surveys, 
increases the representativeness of the sample and the number of observations. 
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analysis in levels or logs we get 1,460 observations in total. From Table 4 of the 
appendix it is clear that the three countries have similar number of observations for the 
two-year period: Guatemala has 468 firms, Honduras 472 and Nicaragua 521. 
In all the regressions we use several productivity measures, 11 dummy variables (Dr , r 
= 1, 2, ..., 11) and a constant term (intercept). That is, we control for a constant industry 
effect of the nine industries (apparel, beverages, chemicals/rubber, food/tobacco, 
furniture/wood, leather/shoes, nonmetallic minerals, textiles, metal), by including only 
eight dummy variables, leaving out apparel to avoid having perfect multicolinearity 
with the constant term. Similarly, we add only one yearly dummy variable leaving out 
the corresponding dummy for the year 2001. Finally when we pool countries, to control 
for a constant country effect, we include two dummies, one for Honduras and the other 
for Nicaragua, with Guatemala omitted. In the case of Costa Rica we have enough 
observations to avoid pooling the ICs with the other three Caribbean countries but we 
also use 9 dummy variables (seven industry dummies and two dummies of year). 
1.2 The level of firms’ productivity 
To estimate productivity in levels we have to specify a functional form of the 
production function. If the functional form F(L,M,K) is Cobb-Douglas, estimating 
productivity in levels requires estimation of the following well known equation, 
 
log log log log logit L it M it K it p itY L M K Pα α α α= + + + + .                                    (6) 
 
When the parametric functional form of the production function is Translog, the 
equation becomes: 
 
2 2 21 1 1) )
2 2 2
)(log ) )(log )
.
log log log log
(log ) (log (log
(log )(log ) (log (log
log
it
it it it it
p
it it it itL M K
it itLL MM KK
it itLM LK MK
it
K K
Y L M K
L M K
L M L M
P
α α α
α α α
α α α
α
+ +
+
= + + +
+ +
+ + +
+ +
             (7) 
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The third alternative considered in this paper is to use a nonparametric or index number 
approach based on cost-shares from Hall (1990) to obtain the Solow´s residual in levels 
(logs) 
 
ˆlog log log log logit it L it M it K itP Y s L s M s K= − − −                                      (8) 
 
where js  is the aggregate average cost shares from the last two years
7
 given by 
, , 1
1
( )
2
j j t j ts s s −= +  for j = L, M and K. The advantage of the Solow residuals, 
Solow(1957), is that it does not require the inputs (L, M, K) to be exogenous nor the 
input-output elasticities to be constant nor heterogeneous. The drawback is that it 
requires to have constant returns to scale (CRS) and at least competitive input markets. 
Measuring productivity in levels (or in logs) it is less demanding in terms of:  
(i) data quality (since it allows to treat unbalanced panel without loosing many 
observations),  
(ii) measurement errors, and  
(iii) allowing constant firm specific fixed IC variables (observable fixed effects). 
 
This productivity approach in levels is in line with Hall and Jones (1999) when they say 
that “to explain differences in levels of long-run economic success across countries, one 
is forced to focus on more basic determinants: infrastructure, persistent barriers (why is 
technology and capital not moving fast across borders) ...” and continue saying that 
“Long-run determinants of economic success are factors that are changing slowly over 
time”. Those determinants are associated in this paper with firm specific investment 
climate (IC) fixed effects. 
Therefore, the estimation strategy suggested for productivity levels, can be justified 
from the following simplified structural simultaneous equations model which includes 
the following equations: a production function, a productivity equation, determinants of 
the unobserved firm specific time-fixed effects and the inputs demands of L, M and K 
(for simplicity we only write the equation for L in (9.d)). That is, 
 
                                                 
7
 When there is only firm information about a single year we take the average cost share of the firms of 
that year. 
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log log log log log
it L it M it K it it
Y L M K Pα α α= + + +                                      (9.a) 
,
log
j it P iti Ds j DT tP wa D D αα α= + + + +′ ′                                                    (9.b)  
, ,i iIC P i C P ia IC C εα α= + +′ ′                                                             (9.c) 
LogLit =  δ´IC,L ICL,i + δLw log (wages)it+ vLit .                                         (9.d) 
 
where, Y is firms’ output (sales), L is employment, M denotes intermediate materials, K is the 
capital stock, IC and C are time-fixed effect vectors of investment climate and control variables, 
and Dj and Dt are the vectors of industry and year dummies.  
The usually unobserved time fixed effects ( ia ) of the TFP equation (9.b) are here proxy by the 
set of observed time fixed components IC, and C variables of (9.c) and a remaining unobserved 
random effects ( iε ). The two random error terms of the system, iε  and itw , are assumed to be 
conditionally uncorrelated with the explanatory L, M, K, INF, IC and C variables
8
 of equation 
(10), 
, ,log log log logit L it M it K it P itIC P i C P i Ds j DT tY L M K uIC C D Dα α α αα α α α= + + + + + + +′ ′ ′ ′+    (10) 
Therefore, the regression equation (10) is representing the conditional expectation plus a 
composite random-effect error term equal to it i itu wε= +  and should satisfy standard 
assumptions of random effects (RE) conditional models. That is, 
, ,
, ,
log log log ,
log log log ,
/ , , , , , , 0
/ , , , , , 0
it it it
it it it
it P i P i j t i
i P i P i j t
L M K
L M K
E w IC C D D
E IC C D D
ε
ε
  = 
  = 
 
2
, ,log log log ,/ , , , , ,it it iti P i P i j tL M Kand Var IC C D D εε σ  =  .  
Notice that we need to condition on the observable fixed effects (IC) to get the 
orthogonally condition of the inputs L, M and K. That is 
log log log/ , , , , 0
it it itit j tL M KE w D D  ≠   and also log log log/ , , , , 0it it iti j tL M KE a D D  ≠   
and therefore the correlation between the unobserved effects and the inputs come the 
time fixed IC variables. As will become clear later on, the fact that this conditional 
expectation of ia  is not equal to cero, invalidates one of the main assumptions of 
                                                 
8 Under this formulation (and other standard conditions) the OLS estimator of the productivity equation (4.2) with 
robust standard errors is consistent, although a more efficient estimator (GLS) is given by the random effects (RE) 
estimator that takes into consideration the particular covariance structure of the error term, i itwε + , which 
introduces certain type of heteroskedasticity in the regression errors of (4.2).  
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section 4.4 where we discuss Wooldridge (2005) procedure of estimating Ackerberg et 
al (2007). 
Equation (9.a) is the familiar Cobb-Douglas production function, but it is obvious that 
the argument applies to other functional forms, like the Translog. The second equation 
(9.b) is the usual firm level productivity equation of firm i in year t. Productivity 
depends on the unobserved firm specific effects, ai, a vector of firm control variables 
(Cit), industry, country and year dummies (Dr) and the productivity shocks (wit) which 
are assumed to be uncorrelated with the inputs (L, M and K).  
Many of the usually unobserved firm specific fixed effects (ai) are now observed at the 
micro level (firm level), due to the detailed firm specific information obtained from the 
ICA´s surveys. In equation (9.c) we add an extra random firm specific fixed effect term 
(εi) which is the part of the unobserved time fixed effects not correlated with the IC 
variables (ICi). Notice, that since the number of available firm specific ICi variables is 
very large (in our data base we used more than 50 time fixed effect terms) it is 
reasonable to assume that εi’s are uncorrelated with the inputs after conditioning in IC 
information. The last equation is the input demand equation derived from a competitive 
labor market
9
. In particular, the demand for labor depends on wages but also on certain 
investment climate (IC) fixed effects that affects also the productivity equation. 
From this simple structural simultaneous equation model, it is clear that a 2-step 
estimation approach, where we first estimate the single equation (9.a) to get a measure 
of productivity and second we use this estimated productivity measure to evaluate the 
impact of IC variables, will render inconsistent least squares estimations. The 
measurement error problem of the dependent variable (LogPit) of equation (9.b) is 
transmitted to rest of the parameters of the productivity equation. The reason is clear, 
the measurement error term of the dependent variable of equation (9b) includes the 
inputs (labor, etc.) which from (9.d) are correlated with the IC explanatory variables.  
From this simple simultaneous equation model it is clear that direct applications of the 
production function estimation procedures proposed by of Olley and Pakes (1996), 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and Akerberg, Caves and Frazer (2007) might generate 
inconsistent parameter estimates in their first step, derived from the correlation of the 
inputs with IC variables. Furthermore, these sophisticated estimation procedures require 
                                                 
9
  For simplicity we omit the input demand equations of the other two inputs, intermediate materials (M) 
and capital (K). However, it is clear that IC variables will affect as well those input demands and the same 
argument applied to the estimation of those inputs-output elasticities. 
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at least two years of firm level data, and, as we pointed out before, we would loose 
many observations if we have to track the same firm for more than one year because 
usually panels based on IC surveys are usually very unbalanced. 
The solution we propose to address the endogeneity of the inputs is to estimate an 
extended production function that incorporates the IC variables driving endogeneity. By 
joint estimation of the input-output elasticities and the rest of the parameters of the 
system (IC and C variables), the IC variables are used as proxies for the unobserved 
firm specific effects (ai) and we are therefore controlling for the common cause of 
endogeneity. 
Using similar arguments, we could consistently estimate by least squares, the following 
Translog extended production function, 
 
2 2 2
, , ,
1 1
, , ,
, , ,
, , ,
1 1 1
) )
2 2 2
)(log ) )(log )
log log
log log log log
(log ) (log (log
(log )(log ) (log (log
IC C
it
it it it it
q q
IC r it C r it D
r r
it it it itL j M j K j
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it itLM j LK j MK jK K
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Y L M K
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α α α
α α α
α α α
α α α
= =
+ +
+
+ + +
= + + +
+ +
+ + +
∑ ∑
1
.
Dq
r r P it
r
D uα
=
+ +∑
        (11) 
This general local functional approximation, allows us to check whether the technology 
(at the aggregate level or at the industry level) is Cobb-Douglas. Furthermore, with both 
parametric specifications of the production function we can test the constant returns to 
scale
10
 (CRS) condition behind Solow´s residuals ( log
it
P ), see equation (8). From 
equation (12) we can estimate the IC elasticities and semi-elasticities,  
 
, , , , ,
1 1 1
log log log .
IC C D
q q q
it IC r r i C r r it D r r P it
r r r
P IC C D uα α α α
= = =
= + + + +∑ ∑ ∑                                  (12) 
 
Since there is no single salient measure of productivity (Pit), any empirical evaluation on 
the productivity impact of IC variables might critically depend on the way productivity 
is measured. Therefore, to get reliable empirical results for policy analysis, we suggest 
                                                 
10
 For example, if the coefficients of the inputs (L, M, and K) in the Cobb-Douglas specification of the 
production function add up to one. Similar but more complicated coefficient restrictions apply for a CRS 
Translog production function. Tables 8, 9 and 10 show the results for the pool of countries and for Costa 
Rica. 
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to look for robust empirical results using several productivity measures. This is the 
approach we will follow in the rest of the paper. 
For this purpose, we use the 10 productivity measures (see section 3) that best fit with 
the characteristics of our data set: two levels of aggregation (countries and industries), 
with two parametric production functions (Cobb-Douglas and the Translog) and the 
Solow residuals for each level of aggregation.  
Controlling for the largest set of IC variables and firm characteristics in equations (10) 
and (11) we can get, under standard regularity conditions, consistent and unbiased least 
squares estimators of the parameters of the production function and of the productivity 
equation. That is, we can run OLS from a one-step regression
11
 based on the extended 
production function (10). In the empirical section we allow the errors (uit) from (10) and 
(11) to be heteroskedastic and therefore we will be using pooling OLS with robust 
standard errors and also random effects (RE) estimators (GLS). 
1.3 Endogeneity of the IC Variables 
Another econometric problem that we have to face in estimating (10), (11) and (12) is 
the possible endogeneity of IC variables and some C variables. The traditional 
instrumental variable (IV) approach is difficult to implement in this context, given that 
we only have IC variables for one year and therefore we cannot use the natural 
instruments like those provided by their on lags, and that it is difficult to find good and 
convincing instruments for them.  
To control for the endogeneity of the IC variables, we use the region-industry average 
of the plant level investment climate variables ( IC ) instead of the crude IC variables. 
This is a common solution in panel data studies at the firm level. In the pool of 
countries we have, in total, 13 regions for the three countries and 9 industries for each 
country (See Table 1 for details). In Costa Rica, we have 7 regions and 8 industries (See 
Table 2). Taking region and industry averages instead of the individual IC variables, is 
also useful to mitigate the effect of missing individual IC observations. This is an 
important issue in most of the IC surveys. 
                                                 
11
 Alternatively, we could have used an equivalent two-step control function approach procedure where 
we first estimate by OLS a regression of each of the inputs on all the IC and C variables (partialling out) 
and then include the residuals of each estimated input equation, instead of the observed inputs, in the 
production function.  
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1.4 Strategy for IC Variables’ Selection 
The econometric methodology applied for the selection of the variables (IC, C and PE) 
goes from the general to the specific. The omitted variables problem that we encounter, 
starting from a too simple model generates biased and inconsistent parameter estimates. 
On the contrary, adding irrelevant variables (meaning starting from a very general 
model with some variables that are irrelevant) gives unbiased and consistent, but 
inefficient, estimates. Therefore, we start from a general model, such as equations (10) 
and (11) with all the variables of Tables 3a to 3d included at once, and we reduce this 
general model to a simpler one with relevant (significant) variables
12
. Note that the final 
estimated model is efficiently estimated once we have deleted insignificant or irrelevant 
variables.  
In the reduction process we should not delete all insignificant variables at once. Due to 
multicolinearity, if we drop one variable that is highly correlated with others, some of 
the insignificant variables might become significant. An informative statistic for this 
purpose is the variation of the R
2
 of the regression (or the standard error of the 
regression). The R
2
 of the simplified model with only significant or relevant variables, 
see Table 11 for Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua and Table 12 for Costa Rica, is 
smaller but close to the initial R
2
 of the most general regression model. We applied this 
iterative procedure, eliminating the less significant variables leaving, for interpretive 
purposes, at least one IC variable from each broad category (infrastructure, 
bureaucracy/corruption, crime, technology and quality, human capital, corporate 
governance, etc.). The estimated explanatory variables of the regression models of 
Tables 11 and 12 of the appendix were selected in this way. We include in those tables 
the set of IC variables that were significant in at least one of the 12 specifications 
(pooling OLS or random effects). These regression results are consistent (with equal 
signs and a reasonable range of parameter values). The detailed empirical results are 
explained in the next section. 
                                                 
12
 Sometimes, in the final regression model, we leave IC variables that are not individually significant but 
are relevant for the model (jointly significant, affect the significance of other variables, etc.). When this 
happens it could be due to the presence of multicolinearity among some of the explanatory variables. 
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2 Robustness of the Estimated Productivity-IC Elasticities and 
Semi-elasticities 
As we said before, for policy implications we would like the estimated elasticities, or 
semi-elasticities of IC variables to be robust among: 1) different functional forms of the 
production functions; 2) different consistent estimation procedures; 3) different 
productivity measures; and 4) different levels of aggregation (industry, country, pooling 
across countries, etc). 
 
Summary of Productivity Measures and  
 Estimated Investment Climate (IC) Elasticities  
 
1. Solow´s Residual 
 
Two Step 
Estimation 
 
1.1 Restricted Coef 
 
1.2 Unrestricted Coef 
1.1.a OLS 
1.1.b  RE 
1.2.a OLS 
1.2.b RE 
 
2 (Pit) measures  
4 (IC) elasticities 
 
2. Cobb-Douglas 
 
Single 
Estimation 
 
2.1 Restricted Coef 
 
2.2 Unrestricted Coef 
2.1.a OLS 
2.1.b  RE 
2.2.a OLS 
2.2.b RE 
 
4 (Pit) measures 
4 (IC) elasticities 
 
3. Translog 
 
Single Step 
Estimation 
 
3.1 Restricted Coef 
 
3.2 Unrestricted Coef 
3.1.a OLS 
3.1.b  RE 
3.2.a OLS 
3.2.b RE 
 
4 (Pit) measures 
4 (IC) elasticities 
    
Total  
10 (Pit) measures 
12 (IC) elasticities 
Restricted Coef.= Equal input-output elasticities in all industries of the three countries 
Unrestricted Coef.= Different input output elasticities by industry of the three countries 
OLS = Pooling Ordinary Least Squares estimation (with robust standard errors) 
RE = Random Effects estimation 
 
As mentioned in section 2, to reduce the simultaneous equation bias and the risk of 
getting reverse causality problems if the ICi variables are endogenous, we use their 
region-industry average ( IC j). The coefficients of investment climate ( IC i) variables 
and other plant-specific control (Cit) variables are maintained constant for all the firms 
in Costa Rica and for all the firms in the pool of countries. However, we allow the 
production function elasticities, and therefore the productivity measures, to change for 
each functional form (Cobb-Douglas and Translog), and for each different aggregation 
levels (industry and countries). We consider two levels of aggregation: (i) Restricted 
 22
estimation (equal input-output elasticities among industries for the three countries) and 
(ii) unrestricted estimation (different input-output elasticities for each industry). 
Moreover, we consider two different estimators (pooling OLS and random effects, RE) 
for each productivity measure. The following table summarizes the productivity 
measures and the corresponding IC elasticities that we estimate. 
Thus we obtain 10 different productivity measures (Pit) and we evaluate the impact of 
IC variables on each of them based on two estimation procedures pooling OLS and RE. 
If the sign of the impact of certain IC variables on productivity changes, contingent on 
the productivity measure used, we would not have a robust or solid empirical result for 
policy implementation. However, as we will see later, it is possible to obtain robust and 
consistent results even when the correlations between the alternative measures of 
productivity differ dramatically. Tables 6 and 7 report the correlations between the log 
productivity measures obtained from the four single-step production function estimates 
and from the two Solow residuals. The correlations between the Solow residuals and the 
productivity measures that result from estimating restricted production functions are 
high, ranging from 0.87 to 0.98. However, when we allow for different input elasticities 
across industries (unrestricted production functions) the correlations are lower, ranging 
from 0.69 in the Cobb-Douglas case to 0.11 in the Translog case. 
Figure 2, shows the kernel density of the 1o productivity measures. We observe that that 
are very different and therefore we might expect the IC elasticities on productivity to 
change depending on which one we are using. However, as we will se later on, it is 
possible to get very robust results with any of them. Therefore, it is no so important 
which one to use in practice if the goal is to estimate the IC elasticities, see section 3.3. 
2.1  Restricted Coefficient Estimates (equal input-output elasticities) 
2.1.1 Solow´s Residual (Two-step restricted estimation) 
We first obtain the Solow residuals (Pit) as in equation (8) and then estimate the impact 
of IC variables on Pit through regression techniques. This two-step approach overcomes 
the endogeneity problem for the inputs. 
Table 8 shows that the cost share of labor is 0.36 in the pool of countries and 0.33 in 
Costa Rica. The cost shares of intermediate materials are 0.53 and 0.56, respectively, 
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and that of capital 0.11 and 0.11. The cost shares add up to one because we are 
imposing constant returns to scale (CRS). 
The empirical results of estimating equation (12) by pooling the observations from the 
three countries and running OLS and random effects (RE) are in Table 11. Table 12 
shows the same estimates for Costa Rica. We comment these results in section 3.3.  
2.1.2 Cobb-Douglas and Translog Productivities (Single-step restricted 
estimation) 
In this case, we consider that the coefficients of the three inputs (L,M,K) of the Cobb-
Douglas (10) and Translog (11) production functions are constant for the whole 
manufacturing sector. Each of the two equations is estimated in a single step, meaning 
that the parameters of the production function are estimated jointly with the parameters 
of the IC, C and D variables. However, to make the empirical results more readable we 
present them in separate tables. Table 8 shows the elasticities of inputs and Tables 10 
and 11 the elasticities and semi-elasticities of the IC variables. 
In the pool of countries, the estimated labor elasticity of the Cobb-Douglas production 
function is 0.43 (OLS) and 0.48 (RE), the intermediate materials elasticity is 0.52 (OLS) 
and 0.45 (RE). Finally, the elasticity of capital is 0.07 for both OLS and RE. With both 
estimation procedures, we can not reject the constant returns to scale (CRS) hypothesis. 
In the case of Costa Rica, the estimated input elasticities are as follows: (i) labor, 0.31 
by OLS and 0.29 by RE, (ii) intermediate materials, 0.53 by OLS and 0.47 by RE, and 
(iii) capital, 0.12 by OLS and RE. In this case, the CRS hypothesis is rejected at any 
reasonable significance value in the case of RE and at 10% in the case of OLS (the p-
value is 0.0649). 
The empirical results obtained assuming a Translog production function are also in 
Table 8. The Translog specification allows to test whether the production function is 
Cobb-Douglas. The Cobb-Douglas specification is rejected with a p-value of 0 both for 
the pool of countries and for Costa Rica. The CRS is not rejected at any reasonable 
significance level for the pool of countries and rejected at any significance level for 
Costa Rica. 
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2.2 Unrestricted Production Function Coefficients (by Industry) 
In this case, the coefficients of the inputs (L, M and K) in the production function vary 
by industry. Table 1 shows the definition of the industries for the pool of countries and 
Table 2 for Costa Rica.  
2.2.1 Solow´s Residuals (Two-step unrestricted estimation) 
First, the costs shares of each industry are reported in Table 9.a (pool of countries) and 
Table 9.b (Costa Rica). We can see that there is a certain homogeneity among the 9 
sectors. Intermediate materials (M) always has the highest share, with almost 50%, 
followed by the cost share of labor, at nearly 40% and capital, around 10%.  
Second, the empirical results from the OLS and the random effects estimates of equation 
(12) are included in Table 11 (pool of countries) and Table 12 (Costa Rica). 
2.2.2 Cobb-Douglas and Translog Productivities (Single-step unrestricted 
estimation by industry) 
In this case, the production function specifications derived in equations (10) and (11) 
become the production functions for each industry j, j=1,2 ,...,9. Each equation is 
estimated by OLS and by random effects (RE). Once again, we separate the information 
on the production function elasticities from the information on the IC elasticities to 
make the tables more readable although all the parameters were jointly estimated. 
Tables 9.a and 9.b show the Cobb-Douglas specification for the pool of countries and 
Costa Rica, respectively, and Tables 10.a and 10.b the Translog specification.  
When estimating a Cobb-Douglas specification, in the pool of countries, the constant 
returns to scale (CRS) condition is non rejected in six of the nine sectors (Apparel, Food 
and Tobacco, Furniture and Wood, Nonmetallic minerals, Textiles and Metal Products). 
In the industry of Chemical and Rubber the hypothesis is strongly rejected and in the 
other sector the evidence is mixed. 
For some sectors like leather/shoes, the estimated input-output elasticities are very 
different from the values obtained from the cost shares given by the two-step procedure 
with Solow residuals, meaning that the industries have certain heterogeneity in their 
input-output elasticities. Therefore, the corresponding productivity measures should 
differ in a significant way. Tables 6 and 7 and Figures 2 and 3 show that this is the case.  
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With the trasnlog specification the CRS hypothesis is only rejected in the Apparel 
sector. The evidence in the other industries is mixed in the sense that is rejected in the 
OLS and not rejected in the RE estimation. 
In the case of Costa Rica the CRS hypothesis is not rejected when estimating a Cobb-
Douglas specification in three out of eight industries and rejected two. (See Table 9.b.) 
The empirical results of the Translog production function parameters are included in 
Table 10.a. The CRS hypothesis is rejected in 5 industries and not rejected in one. The 
Cobb-Douglas specification is rejected in six out of eight sectors it was rejected. The 
industries that failed to reject the Cobb-Douglas specification also failed to reject CRS. 
 
2.3 Empirical Results: The impact of the IC variables on firms’ 
productivity 
The question of interest is whether these new productivity measures yield similar 
elasticity and semi-elasticity estimates for the IC effects on productivity.  
Before discussing the effects of different IC variables on productivity, it is important to 
take into account that the economic interpretation of each investment climate coefficient 
is contingent on the units of measurement of each IC variable and on the 
transformations performed on them (logs, fractions, percentages, qualitative 
constructions, etc.). Since productivity variables are always in logs, when the IC 
variable is also expressed in logs, the estimated coefficient is a constant productivity-IC 
elasticity; and when the IC variable is not expressed in logs, the estimated coefficient is 
generally described as a productivity-IC semi-elasticity
13
. While the constant 
productivity-IC elasticity measures the percentage change in productivity induced by a 
percentage change in the IC variable, the semi-elasticity coefficient multiplied by 100, 
measures the percentage change in productivity induced by a unitary change in the IC 
variable. A detailed explanation of the units of measurement of each variable is given 
Tables 11 and 12 with the estimated elasticities and semi-elasticities for the 10 
                                                 
13
 While it is sometimes natural to express an IC variable in log form, for some types of IC variables it is 
more appropriate not to do so. For example, when an IC variables is a fraction or a percentage number 
with some data equal to 0 or close to 0. Notice however that expressing IC variables in fractions allow us 
to interpret also their coefficients as constant elasticities and not as semi-elasticities. 
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productivity measures. Table 11 shows the results for the pool of countries and Table 12 
for Costa Rica. 
As we mention before, Investment Climate (IC) variables were classified into five broad 
categories: (a) Red Tape, Corruption and Crime, (b) Infrastructure, (c) Quality, 
Innovation and Labor Skills, (d) Finance and Corporate Governance, and (e) Other 
control variables. 
 
Within each group, all IC variables have the expected signs and the estimated 
elasticities or semi-elasticities are always within a reasonable range of values for the 10 
productivity measures. In absolute terms, the highest elasticity values correspond to the 
Solow residual or to the Cobb-Douglas specification, while the lowest usually 
correspond to the Translog production function. Therefore, we observe a trade-off 
between the role played by inputs (labor, intermediate materials and capital) and the role 
played by the IC variables and other control variables. The robustness of these 
empirical results across productivity measures allows us to obtain consistent evaluations 
of the IC determinants of productivity. 
The Translog results on the empirical estimates of the IC elasticities are the same in 
terms of signs but less number of parameters become significant now, see Table C5.2. 
The reason is clear: the Translog specification includes many nonlinear terms of the 
inputs variables of each sector and they compete with the explanatory power of IC 
variables or C characteristics. The important point is that all the signs of the coefficients 
of the IC and C variables are maintained
14
. Therefore, the results on the impact of IC 
variables on productivity are consistent and robust to different productivity measures, 
suggesting that we can use the signs and the range of estimated elasticities for policy 
analysis
15
. 
Finally, we also present the individual estimates of the elasticities or semi-elasticities of 
IC variables on productivity in Figures 4 and 5. 
                                                 
14
 We also considered the possibility of having nonlinear impacts of IC variables on productivity in 
equations (10), (11) and (12) by including linear terms as well as the square and cubic terms of the IC 
and C variables that appear in those equations. However, they were not significant. 
15
 Those elasticity and semi-elasticity parameter were also estimated for small and large firms as well as 
for young and old firms. The results are reported in Escribano and Guasch (2005). 
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2.4 The contribution of the IC variables to average productivity 
To complement the evaluation of the impact of IC variables on TFP we will evaluate the 
regressions estimates at their corresponding sample means. Since the 10 productivity 
measures of Figure 2 are very different we will fist find their demean counterpart to 
makes them more similar. The results are presented in Figure 3. To make this 
productivity methodology a valid benchmark for cross-country comparisons form now 
on we will always evaluate the IC impacts on average TFP coming from the restricted 
Solow’s residuals of each country.  
Replacing each one of IC elasticity by its estimate in equation (12) using as a measure 
of TFP the aggregate Solow residual, and averaging across firms of each country, it is 
possible to evaluate country by country, the contribution of each IC variable to the 
average log of productivity.  
This mean evaluation has two advantages: (i) the contribution of each variable can be 
obtained as a percentage and percentage can be added by groups of IC variables, and (ii) 
even when we estimate equal coefficients for all the firms in the pool of countries 
(Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua), we can average by country and therefore we can 
have the contribution of each IC variable by country. 
Figure 6 shows the contribution of each IC variable to the average log of productivity in 
each country of the pool of countries (Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua) and Figure 
7 shows the same for Costa Rica. 
In all the countries the group of IC variables with larger contribution is Red Tape, 
Corruption and Crime. This group represents 41.1%, 36.6%, 36.6%, and 37.8% of the 
whole contribution of IC variables and C variables in Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
and Costa Rica, respectively. The second group of variables with large contribution to 
the average log productivity is Infrastructures in Guatemala (30.5%), Honduras 
(32.3%), and Nicaragua (32.3%) and Finance and Corporate Governance in Costa Rica 
(25.3). In Costa Rica Infrastructures also has a large contribution (19.2%). 
These Figures also show the contribution of each IC variable. In the group of Red Tape, 
Corruption and Crime, the variable with the largest contribution is the number of days 
spent in inspections and regulation related activities in Guatemala, Honduras, and 
Nicaragua and the percentage of sales that is declared for tax purposes in Costa Rica. 
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In the group of infrastructures the most important variables in Guatemala, Honduras, 
and Nicaragua are the number of days that a firm needs to clear customs when it imports 
and whether the firm uses internet to communicate with its clients or suppliers. In Costa 
Rica, is the number of days that a firm has to wait after asking for electricity. 
The group of other control variables explains around 16% of the impact of the IC 
variables in Honduras and Nicaragua, 13% in Guatemala and 11% in Costa Rica. The 
most important variable in this group is the age of the firm that explain around 8% in 
the Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. In Costa Rica the most important variable is 
the number of competitors that explain 7.9% of the impact of IC variables on firms’ 
productivity.  
The last group in order of importance in the four countries is quality, innovation and 
labor skills. The contribution of this group of variables is around 10%. In Guatemala, 
Honduras and Nicaragua, the factor with the largest contribution is training provided 
beyond “on the job”. In Costa Rica, in this group of variables, there are many variables 
that resulted significant but none of them has a contribution larger than 2%. 
3 Further Robustness 
In this section, we estimate the production function considering structural procedures 
based on Olley and Pakes (1996). In particular, we consider the procedures of 
Levinshon and Petrin (2003) and Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2007). 
3.1 Olley and Pakes (OP) 
 The Olley and Pakes (1996) estimation algorithm takes into account the attrition bias 
due to exiting firms, as well as the simultaneous equation problem already mentioned. 
Given that the IC surveys are not designed to address issues related to firms’ survival 
we focus our attention on the simultaneous equation problem. 
As we mention before, the production function can be written in logs as follows 
 
it L it M it K it it ity l m k pα α α ε= + + + +  ,                                                (13) 
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where y is the logarithm of firm’s i output, l is labor, m denotes intermediate inputs and 
k is capital stock, all in logs. The sequence {pit: t=1, 2,…, t} is unobserved productivity 
and {εit: t=1, 2,…, t} is a sequence of i.i.d unanticipated shocks. 
In their structural model the investment in fixed assets is function of firm’s productivity 
and firm’s the capital stock, i.e., ( , )t t t ti h p k= . They show that iit is strictly 
monotonous in pit and therefore it is possible to invert it out obtaining 
1 ( , )t t t tp h i k
−
= . Substituting this expression into (13) we have  
 
1( , )L it M it K it t it it ity l m k h i kα α α ε
−
= + + + +  .                                                  (14) 
 
This equation allows us to obtain estimates of the labor and materials coefficients, as 
well as, an estimation of the composite term, 1ˆ ( , )it K it t it it itk h i kφ α ε−= + + . 
The next step is related to the estimation of the capital coefficient in (13). Assuming 
that capital is a fixed input in the sense that it depends on the amount of capital in 
period t-1 and on the investment decisions taken also in period t-1, and assuming that 
productivity follows a first order Markov process, that is, 
1 2 0 1( | , ,..., ) ( | )it it it i it itp p p p p pρ ρ− − −= , we have the moment condition that allow us to 
identify the capital coefficient. That is, 1 1(1 )it ït itk i kδ− −= + −  with 1[ | ]it it it itp E p p ξ−= +  
yields to [ | ] 0it itE k ξ = . The second step involves replacing the estimates of Lα , Mα  
and ˆitφ  in equation (14), i.e., 
, 1 1
ˆˆ ˆ ( )it L it M it K it i t K it it ity l m k g kα α α φ α µ ε− −− − = + − + + .                             (15) 
To estimate this equation, g(.) is approximated by a third or fourth order series 
expansion on tφ , and kit-1. 
3.2 Levinsohn and Petrin (LP) 
One possible pitfall of OP procedure is that in many data sets the investment variable 
takes many zero values. Levinshon and Petrin (2003) addressed this problem by using 
the intermediate inputs demand instead of the investment equation. Let 
),( itittit kpfm =                                                                    (16) 
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be the intermediate inputs demand. If monotonicity holds, then this expression can be 
inverted and replaced in equation (13). Then, the resulting production function is given 
by 
ititittitMitKitL kmfmkly εααα ++++=
− ),(1 .                                          (17) 
 
As in the OP approach, it is possible to obtain an estimate of the composite term 
1ˆ ( , )it K it M it t it it itk m f m kφ α α ε−= + + + . 
The timing assumption regarding inputs is important. LP assumes that materials are 
chosen in the moment that the production takes place and therefore, it is influenced by 
productivity. Additionally, they assume that labor is chosen in same point after 
materials materials election. If this assumption does not hold, then lit would affect the 
optimal choice of mit. Hence, given these assumptions, in the last step there are two 
coefficients to estimate and identification is provided by the next two moment 
conditions: (i) [ ( , ) | ] 0it K M itE kξ α α = , and (ii) 1[ ( , ) | ] 0it K M itE mξ α α − = . 
3.3 Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (ACF) 
Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2007) point out that productivity also affect the demand 
of labor and therefore it coefficient can not be identified in the first step. If labor is a 
function of productivity and capital, ( , )it t it itl p kγ= , and intermediate inputs are used as 
proxy rather like in LP
16
, then  
 
1( , ) ( ( , ), ) ( , )it t it it t t it it it t it itl p k f k m k h m kγ γ −= = = . 
 
Now, it is not possible to identify the labor coefficient in the first step and all the 
coefficients must be estimated in the second step. 
In this case, the production function is given by ( , )it t it it ity m kφ ε= + . ACF like OP and 
LP, also assume a first order Markov process for productivity and therefore the set of 
moment conditions that allows identification of the three parameters are: (i) 
                                                 
16
 The procedure can also be implemented using investment as proxy. 
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[ ( , , ) | ] 0it L K M itE kξ α α α = , (ii) 1[ ( , , ) | ] 0it L K M itE mξ α α α − = , and (iii) 
1[ ( , , ) | ] 0it L K M itE lξ α α α − = . 
If labor is a dynamic input, i.e., the current choice of labor may affect future choices, 
then the expressions of intermediate materials and labor demand become 
1( , , )it t it it itm f p k l −=  and 1( , , )it t it it itl p k lγ −= , respectively. This yields to 
1( , , )it t it it it ity m k lφ ε−= + , with an additional moment condition provided by 
1[ ( , , ) | , ] 0it L K M it itE l kξ α α α − = . 
When labor is not a variable input, i.e., it is chosen in the moment t-b between t and t-1, 
the intermediate inputs and labor demand become ( , , )it t it it itm f p k l=  and 
( , )it t it b itl p kγ −= , respectively. In this case, the production function is of the form 
( , , )it t it it it ity m k lφ ε= +  and the additional moment condition is as in the previous case 
1[ ( , , ) | , ] 0it L K M it itE l kξ α α α − = . 
3.4 GMM estimation 
Wooldridge (2005) proposed a computational improvement that can be used in the OP, 
LP and ACF procedures. In particular he proposed a GMM procedure to estimate to 
estimate lα , mα and kα . 
Assuming that in (13), ( |  , ,  ) 0it it it itE l m kε = , the expected value of the production 
function is given by 
 
0
0
( |  , ,  ) ( , )
                             ( , )
it it it it l it m it k it it it
l it it it
E y l m k l m k g k m
l h k m
α α α α
α α
= + + + + =
= + +
 
 
for some unknown function ( , )it it itp g m k=  and ( , ) ( , )it it m it k it it ith k m m k g k mα α= + + . 
Note that this equation is the first step of the LP and ACF estimation algorithms. 
The unanticipated productivity shocks follows a first order Markov process and its 
innovations are defined by 1( |  )it it it ita p E p p −= − . The expected value of pit conditional 
on pit-1 is a function f(.) of mit-1 and kit-1, i.e., ( ) ( )[ ]111 , −−− ≡ itititit kmgfppE , then  
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1 1[ ( ,  )]it it it itv f g m k a− −= +                                                            (18) 
 
Plugging (18) into (13) gives 
0 1 1[ ( , )]it l it m it k it it it it ity l m k f g k m aα α α α ε− −= + + + + + +  
If it it itu a e= +  then, 
0 1 1[ ( , )]it l it m it k it it it ity l m k f g k m uα α α α − −= + + + + + .                            (19) 
 
Remember that the equation of the first step in OP, LP and ACF is given by 
0 1 1( , )it l it m it k it it it ity l m k g k mα α α α ε− −= + + + + + .                            (20) 
 
The orthogonality condition for equations (19) and (20) are given by 
1 1 1 1 1 1( | ,  , , ,  ,..., , ,  ) 0it it it it it it i i iE u m k l m k l m k− − − = ,                                   (21) 
1 1 1 1 1 1( |  , ,  , , ,  ,..., , ,  ) 0it it it it it it it i i iE l m k l m k l m kε − − − = ,                                  (22) 
respectively. 
 
The main concern in the estimation of lα , mα and kα  is that we have to deal with 
unknown functions g(.) and f(.). An approach that has been found to work well is to use 
high order polynomials. Thus we have  
0( , ) ( , )it it it itg m k m kλ λ= + c ,                                        (23) 
for a 1XQ vector of functions c(.). Further assume that f(.) can be approximated by a 
polynomial of degree G in c such that (19) and (20) becomes 
0 ( , )it l it m it k it it it ity l m k k mα α α α λ ε= + + + + +c ,                            (24) 
and 
0 1 , 1 , 1( ) ... ( )
G
it l it m it k it i t G i t ity l m k c c uδ α α α ρ λ ρ λ− −= + + + + + + + .                (25) 
Given the moment conditions (21) and (22) it is possible to use an instrumental 
variables procedure for (24) and (25). The most straightforward choice of instruments 
for (24) is simply 
1 (1, , ,  )it it itl k=
0
it
z c ,                                                 (26) 
 where c
0
 is c without k. Instruments for (25) would include  
2 1(1, , ,  , )it it itk l −= it-1 it-1z c q ,                                          (27) 
being q a set of non-linear functions of c (e.g. low order polynomials). 
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A simple estimation approach is to choose, for each i, a matrix of instruments as  
2
2
( , , ) 0
, 2,...,
0
it it
it
it
l
t T
 
= = 
 
itc zZ
z
                                     (28) 
GMM estimation in (24) and (25) is now straightforward. For each t>1 define a residual 
function as  
01
0 12
( )
( )
( ) ... ( )( )
it l it m it k itit
it G
it l it m it k it Git
y l m kr
y l m kr
α α α α λ
δ α α α ρ ρ
− − − − −  
= =   
− − − − − − −   
it
i,t-1 i,t-1
cθ
r θ
c λ c λθ
       (29) 
so that, 
[ ' ( )] 0, 2,...,it itE t T= =Z r θ                                            (30) 
This T-1 conditions can be stacked for each i and standard GMM estimation can be 
used. 
 
3.5 Further empirical results 
Table 8, panel B, shows the estimates of the input elasticities for the LP and ACF 
procedures in the case of Costa Rica. We apply these procedures only to Costa Rica 
because the panels of Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua are very unbalanced and 
these procedures use the lag of the inputs as instruments. For the procedure of ACF we 
use the Wooldridge (2005) GMM procedure with heteroskedastic standard errors. We 
use a polynomial of degree 3 to approximate equation (23), i.e., Q = 3, and a polynomial 
of degree 1 to approximate function f(.), i.e. G=1. As expected, in Table 8 panel B, the 
input-output elasticity of capital obtained by L&P or by ACF are too low, 0.08 and 0.09 
respectively. This is not solved by estimating equation (9a) by fixed effects (FE), 
without controlling for IC variables since the estimated elasticity of capital is 0.07. 
However, remember that when controlling for IC variables a simple OLS with robust 
standard errors, or a random effects estimators, provide an elasticity of capital equal to 
0.12, see Table 8, panel B. A question of interest for further research is how to extend 
O&P, L&P and ACF procedures to control for IC variables. 
However, the robustness of IC elasticities in TFP is  preserved estimating also by these 
procedures. With the estimated input elasticities (from O&P and ACF) we estimated 
firms’ productivity (TFP) and in a second step we evaluated the impact of the 
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investment climate variables selected in section 2 from equation (12). The results are 
shown in Table 15. For comparative purpose, the first column shows the results 
obtained using Solow residual. As can be seen, the IC results on productivity are still 
robust. None of the IC variables change signs and the magnitudes of the coefficients are 
similar.  
4 Conclusion 
There is not a single salient measure of productivity. For the analysis of the investment 
climate (IC) determinants of productivity in Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras and 
Nicaragua, productivity is considered to be that part of the production of goods (sales) 
that is not explained by the main inputs (labor, intermediate materials and capital). This 
productivity concept is sometimes called total factor productivity (TFP) or multifactor 
productivity (MFP). 
Several measures are used to evaluate what is broadly understood as productivity and a 
methodology is developed that produces robust estimates regardless of the measure 
used. We show that it is possible to get consistent and robust estimates (elasticities) of 
investment climate determinants of productivity. This is so no matter whether we use 
productivity measures with a low correlation coefficient, such as 0.11 (very different), 
or a high one, such as 0.98 (similar). 
The main requirement of this econometric methodology for internal consistency is that 
the policy implications must be robust: 1) among different functional forms of the 
production functions, 2) among different consistent estimation procedures, 3) among 
different productivity measures and 4) among different levels of aggregation (industry, 
country, pooling countries, etc.). In our case, all the signs of the estimated coefficients 
are as expected. Obviously, the numerical values of those elasticities parameters vary 
from one productivity measure to the next, but the range of values is reasonable and 
significant in most cases.  
The analysis is undertaken without transforming the variables into rates of growth. 
There are good reasons explaining that decision: (a) the IC variables are available for 
only one year; (b) the panel data for Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua is very 
unbalanced with many more observations in 2002 than in 2001, hence computing rates 
of growth for the non IC variables implies loosing many observations; and (c) 
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measurement errors are enhanced by taking first differences. Therefore, variables in 
levels are used with logarithmic (logs) transformation of output, labor, intermediate 
materials and capital.  
Productivity is estimated as the residual of the production function. To get consistent 
least squares estimates of the input-output elasticities it is necessary that all inputs are 
uncorrelated with productivity. But this is almost never the case with annual data sets, 
like the IC surveys, since the investment climate (IC) variables affect both the inputs 
and the productivity. This condition invalidates any two-step least squares procedures 
where first the productivity variable and then its investment climate determinants are 
estimated, unless you control in both steps by IC variables. This problem also affects 
procedures like Olley and Pakes (1996), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) or Ackerberg et 
al. (2007). 
Given that good instrumental variables are difficult to find for the IC variables, we 
suggest a single-step least squares estimation procedure where the parameters of the 
production function (input-output elasticities) are jointly estimated with the coefficients 
of the IC determinants of productivity. 
A valid two-step approach is also used when the input-output elasticities are obtained, 
following Solow (1957), as cost-shares, since there is no erogeneity requirement of the 
inputs. Once productivity is measured as the Solow residual in levels (logs), the IC 
determinants of productivity can be consistently estimated in a second step. 
The possible endogeneity of the IC variables is reduced by taking their region-industry 
averages. To correct for heteroskedasticity (heterogeneity) of the individual unobserved 
terms, we estimate by least squares (pooling OLS) with robust standard errors and by 
random effects. The results obtained are very similar. 
For policy analysis there is no need to use a single value for the elasticity or semi-
elasticity of each IC variable. In fact, it is more interesting to perform a sensitivity 
analysis based on the range of parameter values obtained for several productivity 
measures.  
Four important categories of investment climate (IC) variables are identified: (a) 
Infrastructure, (b) Read Tape, Corruption and Crime, (c) Finance and Corporate 
Governance and (d) Quality, Innovation and Labor Skills. Within each group, all the IC 
variables always have the expected signs and the estimated elasticities or semi-
elasticities are always within a reasonable value range for the ten productivity measures 
considered. In absolute terms, the higher values of the IC elasticities correspond to the 
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Solow residual or to the Cobb-Douglas specification, while the lowest usually 
correspond to the Translog production function. Therefore, we observe a trade-off 
between the role played by the inputs (labor, intermediate materials and capital) and the 
role played by the IC variables and other control variables.  
In summary, the robustness of these empirical results across 10 productivity measures 
allows us to obtain consistent empirical evaluations of the IC determinants of 
productivity. The estimates show consistently the high impact of investment climate on 
productivity. Overall, it accounts for over 30 percent of productivity. In Guatemala, 
Honduras and Nicaragua, the two most impacting categories are red tape, corruption and 
crime, and infrastructure, accounting respectively for about 12 and 9 percent of 
productivity.  
Although more sophisticated econometric techniques could be applied, to take into 
account that the inputs are not used at full capacity, firms might not be at the frontier of 
the production possibility frontiers, etc., we plan to apply this simple and robust 
procedure to several developing countries. The objective is to identify, at the firm level, 
basic robust empirical regularities on the main bottlenecks on productivity and to make 
cross county comparisons. Those empirical results could be used later on as a 
benchmark for further improvements. 
The policy implications from this simple analysis are clear. Investment climate matters 
enormously and the relative size of the impact of the various investment climate 
variables indicates where the efforts of reform should be placed. 
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Appendix: Tables and Figures 
Table 1: General information at plant level and production function variables: 
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua 
General 
Information 
at Plant 
Level 
Industrial 
classification 
Apparel, beverages, chemical/rubber, food/tobacco, leather/shoes, 
nonmetallic minerals, textiles, metal products. 
Regional 
classification 
Guatemala: Guatemala city, Metropolitan area close to Guatemala city, 
Metropolitan area far from Guatemala city, Altiplano region, Coast region, 
Northwest region. 
Honduras: Western region, Center-South region, Olancho region, North cost 
region. 
Nicaragua: Managua region, Pacific region. 
Production 
Function 
Variables 
Sales Used as the measure of output for the production function estimation. For all 
countries, it is converted into USD using IMF average exchange rates. 
Employment Total number of workers.  
Materials Total costs of intermediate and raw materials used in production (excluding 
fuel). For all countries, it is converted into USD using IMF average 
exchange rates. 
Capital stock Net book value of all fixed assets. 
Labor cost Total expenditures on personnel. 
 
Table 2: General information at plant level and production function variables: 
Costa Rica 
 
General 
Information 
at Plant 
Level 
Industrial 
classification 
Food and beverages; textiles; apparels; wood and furniture; paper and 
edition; chemicals rubber and plastics; non-metallic products; machinery 
and equipment-metallic products. 
Regional 
classification 
San José; Alajuela; Cartago; Heredia; Guanacaste; Puntarenas; Provincia 
Limón. Additional classification used in figures: Great Urban, Rest of 
Central Valley, Rest of the Country. 
Production 
Function 
Variables 
Sales Used as the measure of output for the production function estimation. Sales 
are defined as total sales plus the changes in the inventories of finished 
goods. The series are deflated by using the Industrial Production Price 
Index, base 1999. 
Employment Total number of permanent and temporal workers (full or part time).  
Total hours 
worked per year 
Total number of employees multiplied by the average hours worked per 
year. 
Materials Total costs of intermediate and raw materials used in production (excluding 
fuel). The series are deflated by using the Industrial Production Price Index, 
base 1999. 
Capital stock Net book value of all fixed assets (log). The series are deflated by using the 
Industrial Production Price Index, base 1999. 
User cost of 
capital 
The user cost of capital is defined in terms of the opportunity cost of using 
capital; it is defined as the long term interest rate in Costa Rica (more than 5 
years) plus a depreciation rate of 20% minus the rate of growth of the 
consumption price index. 
Labor cost Total expenditures on personnel, deflated by using the Industrial 
Production Price Index, base 1999. 
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Table 3.a: Investment climate (IC) variables: Infrastructures 
 
Name of the variable Description of the variable 
Days to clear customs for exports Average number of days to clear customs for export. 
Days to clear customs for imports Average number of days to clear customs for imports. 
Power outages Number of power outages suffered by a plant in 2004. 
Average duration of power outages Average duration of power outages suffered by the plant in hours. 
Losses due to power outages Value of the losses due to power outages as a percentage of sales (conditional on the 
plant reporting power outages). 
Water outages Number of water outages suffered by a plant in 2004. 
Average duration of water outages Average duration of water outages suffered by the plant in hours. 
Losses due to water outages Value of the losses due to water outages as a percentage of sales (conditional on the 
plant reporting water outages). 
Fixed phone outages Number of fixed phone outages suffered by a plant in 2004. 
Average duration of fixed phone 
outages 
Average duration of fixed phone outages suffered by the plant in hours. 
Losses due to fixed phone outages Value of the losses due to fixed phone outages as a percentage of sales (conditional on 
the plant reporting fixed phone outages). 
Cellular phone outages Number of cellular phone outages suffered by a plant in 2004. 
Average duration of cellular phone 
outages 
Average duration of cellular phone outages suffered by the plant in hours. 
Losses due to cellular phone outages Value of the losses due to cellular phone outages as a percentage of sales (conditional 
on the plant reporting cellular outages). 
Internet outages Number of internet outages suffered by a plant in 2004. 
Average duration of internet outages Average duration of internet outages suffered by the plant in hours. 
Losses due to internet outages Value of the losses due to internet outages as a percentage of sales (conditional on the 
plant reporting water outages). 
Shipment losses (domestic sales) Fraction of the value of the plant’s average cargo consignment that was lost in 
domestic transit due to breakage, theft, spoilage or other deficiencies of the transport 
means used. 
Shipment losses (exports) Fraction of the value of the plant’s average cargo consignment that was lost in 
international transit due to breakage, theft, spoilage or other deficiencies of the 
transport means used. 
Shipment losses due to spoilages 
(domestic sales) 
Fraction of the value of the plant’s average cargo consignment that was lost in 
domestic transit due to breakage or spoilage. 
Shipment losses due to thefts 
(domestic sales) 
Fraction of the value of the plant’s average cargo consignment that was lost in 
domestic transit due to theft 
Shipment losses due to spoilages 
(exports) 
Fraction of the value of the plant’s average cargo consignment that was lost in 
international transit due to breakage or spoilage. 
Shipment losses due to thefts 
(exports) 
Fraction of the value of the plant’s average cargo consignment that was lost in 
international transit due to theft. 
Wait for electric supply Number of days waiting for a public electric supply since the moment of the 
application to the day the service was received (number of days)   
Wait for water supply Number of days waiting for a public water supply since the moment of the application 
to the day the service was received (number of days)   
Wait for fixed phone Number of days waiting for a fixed phone supply since the moment of the application 
to the day the service was received (number of days)   
Wait for cellular phone Number of days waiting for a cellular phone supply since the moment of the 
application to the day the service was received (number of days)   
Wait for internet connection Number of days waiting for an internet connection since the moment of the 
application to the day the service was received (number of days)   
E-mail Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm use regularly the e-mail to 
communicate with its clients and suppliers. 
Web page Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm use regularly its own web page to 
communicate with its clients and suppliers. 
Payments through internet Percentage of firm's sales that has been paid through internet in 2004.  
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Table 3.b: Investment climate (IC) variables: Red Tabe, Corruption and Crime 
 
Name of the variable Description of the variable 
Criminal attempts Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant suffered any criminal attempt during 
last year. 
Losses due to criminal activity Value of losses due to criminal activity. 
Number of criminal attempts Total number of criminal attempts suffered by the plant during last year. 
Security Cost in security (equipment, staff, etc). 
Illegal payments for protection Cost due to protection payments, e. g. to organized crime, to prevent violence 
(bribery). 
Manager’s time spent in bureaucratic 
issues 
Percentage of managers' time spent in dealing with bureaucratic issues. 
Payments to deal with bureaucratic 
issues 
Dummy that takes value 1 if firms in the main sector occasionally need to give gifts or 
make informal payments to  public officers in order to “get things done” with regard 
to customs, taxes, licenses, legislations, services, etc. 
Average amount of payments to deal 
with bureaucratic issues 
Average amount of payments to deal with bureaucratic issues as a percentage o annual 
total sales in a standard firm. 
Sales declared to taxes Percentage of total sales declared to taxes. 
Labor costs declared Percentage of workforce declared to taxes. 
Number of inspections In the last year, total number of inspections regarding with taxes, employment, health 
control, municipal inspectors, etc. 
Payments to obtain a contract with the 
government 
Dummy that takes value 1 if firms in the main sector occasionally need to give gifts or 
make informal payments in order to get a contract with the government. 
Average payments to obtain a contract 
with the government 
Value of this gifts or payments as a percentage of the contract value 
Conflicts with clients Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm has had any conflict with clients during 
2004 
Conflicts with employees Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm has had any conflict with employees 
during 2004 
Delayed payments Percentage of monthly total sales to private customers that were not paid within the 
agreed time. 
Sales never repaid Percentage of monthly total sales to private customers that were never repaid. 
Cost of entry Cost of entry to the market in terms of days spent waiting for permissions and 
licenses. 
Cost of continuing Cost of continuing in the market in terms of number of days spent waiting for 
permissions and licenses. 
Absenteeism Days of production lost due to absenteeism. 
Civil protest Days of production lost due to civil protest. 
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Table 3.c: Investment climate (IC) variables: Finance and Corporate Governance 
 
Name of the variable Description of the variable 
Trade association Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant belongs to any association or trade 
chamber. 
Credit line Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant reports that it has a credit line. 
Debts with creditors Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm has any debt with suppliers. 
Loan Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant reports that it has a bank loan. 
Loan - Collateral Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm has a loan line and this loan has 
collateral. 
Loan - Value of the collateral Total vale of the collateral as a percentage of total value of the loan. 
Loan - Interest rate Average interest rate applied to the loan during last year. 
Loan - From formal institutions Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the last loan obtained comes from formal 
institutions e.g. state-owned banks, domestic private banks, foreign private banks, off-
shore banking, etc. 
Loan - From informal institutions Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the last loan obtained comes from non-formal 
institutions e.g. family or money lenders. 
External auditory Dummy variable that takes value 1 if firm's annual statements are engaged in a 
process of external auditory. 
Profit Firm's profits after taxes as a percentage of total sales.  
Reinvestment Percentage of profits that were reinvested in the firm last year. 
Owner of the lands Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm is the owner of almost all its lands. 
Owner of the buildings Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm is the owner of almost all its buildings. 
Financing - Internal founds Percentage of financing that comes from internal founds. 
Financing - State-owned banks Percentage of financing that comes from state-owned banks. 
Financing - Domestic private banks Percentage of financing that comes from domestic private banks. 
Financing - Foreign private banks Percentage of financing that comes from foreign private banks. 
Financing - Off-shore banks Percentage of financing that comes from off-shore banks. 
Financing - Governmental programs Percentage of financing that comes from governmental programs. 
Financing - Non-financial institutions Percentage of financing that comes from non-financial institutions. 
Financing - Family loans Percentage of financing that comes from family loans. 
Financing - Informal sources Percentage of financing that comes from informal sources. 
Financing - Credit from suppliers Percentage of financing that comes from credits from suppliers. 
Investment - Internal founds Percentage of investments financed with internal founds. 
Investment - State-owned banks Percentage of investments financed with state-owned banks. 
Investment - Domestic private banks Percentage of investments financed with domestic private banks. 
Investment - Foreign private banks Percentage of investments financed with foreign private banks. 
Investment - Off-shore banks Percentage of investments financed with off-shore banks. 
Investment - Governmental programs Percentage of investments financed with governmental programs. 
Investment - Non-financial institutions Percentage of investments financed with non-financial institutions. 
Investment - Family loans Percentage of investments financed with family loans. 
Investment - Informal sources Percentage of investments financed with informal sources. 
Investment - Credit from suppliers Percentage of investments financed with credits from suppliers. 
Checking account Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm has a checking account 
Insurance Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm has insurances. 
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Table 3.d: Investment climate (IC) variables: Quality innovation, and labor skills 
 
Name of the variable Description of the variable 
Quality certification Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant has a quality certification. 
ISO certification Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant has any kind of ISO certification. 
New product Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant has developed a new product line. 
Product improvement Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant has developed a product improvement. 
Joint venture Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm has established a joint venture with a 
foreign partner. 
New technological license Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant has obtained a new agreement of 
technological license. 
Outsourcing Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant has outsourced any activity previously 
performed in the firm. 
LACOMET Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant has obtained a certification of 
assessment of equipments and installations (LACOMET). 
R + D Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant reports to perform R+D activities. 
Internal R + D Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant performed internal  R+D activities 
during 2004. 
External R + D Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant performed external  R+D activities 
during 2004. 
Computer controlled machinery Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant has any computer controlled machinery 
Quality control Number of plant's employees designated to deal with tasks related to quality control of 
the final products. 
Design and engineering Number of plant's employees designated to deal with tasks related to engineering and 
design.  
New technology Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm has acquired any new technology with 
important implications in the production process. 
Professional workers Percentage of professional workers in firm's staff. 
Skilled workers Percentage of skilled workers in firm's staff. 
Unskilled workers Percentage of unskilled workers in firm's staff. 
Female workers Percentage of female workers in firm's staff. 
Immigrant workers Percentage of immigrant workers in firm's staff. 
Fired workers Percentage of employees fired during last year. 
Training to skilled workers Percentage of skilled workers that received formal training during last year. 
Weeks of training to skilled workers Average number of weeks of formal training to skilled workers. 
Training to unskilled workers Percentage of unskilled workers that received formal training during last year. 
Weeks of training to unskilled 
workers 
Average number of weeks of formal training to unskilled workers. 
IT training Percentage of workers that received training in information and communication 
technologies during last year. 
Staff with computer  Percentage of employees that use a computer. 
Strikes Days of production lost due to strikes. 
University staff Percentage of total staff with at least one year of university education. 
Education of the manager Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the manager of the plant has a bachelor or 
higher education degree. 
Experience of the manager Number of years of experience of the manager. 
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Table 3.e: Investment climate (IC) variables: Other Control Variables 
 
Name of the variable Description of the variable 
Incorporated company Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant is an incorporated company. 
Open incorporated company Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant is an open incorporated company. 
Public Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm belongs to the government. 
Foreign direct investment Dummy variable that takes value 1 if any part of the capital of the firm is foreign. 
Number of competitors Number of competitors in the main market. 
Industrial zone Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm is located in an industrial zone. 
ICC Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm has obtained any profit from the trade 
agreement signed with the United Sates "Iniciativa de la Cuenca del Caribe" (ICC). 
Trade agreements Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm has obtained any profit from any 
agreement signed by its government related with free trade. 
Capacity utilization Average percentage of capacity used during last year. 
Exporter Dummy variable that takes value 1 if direct exports are greater than 10%.  
Importer Dummy variable that takes value 1 if direct imports are greater than 10%.  
Age Difference between the year that the plant started operations and current year. 
Trade union Percentage of workers that belongs to a syndicate. 
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Table 4: Total number of observations used in the IC regressions by country and 
industry 
 
  Pool Total Pool  Costa Rica 
  Guatemala  Honduras Nicaragua  
Apparel  129 70 64 263  111 
Food/ Tobacco 102 134 68 304  0 
Beverages 8 19 17 44  0 
Food and beverages 0 0 0 0  132 
Chemical/Rubber 61 35 67 163  148 
Furniture/ Wood 56 126 127 309  145 
Leather/ Shoes 6 0 45 51  0 
Nonmetallic minerals 36 44 69 149  104 
Textiles 22 9 7 38  0 
Metal Products  48 35 57 140  64 
Paper & edition 0 0 0 0  128 
Machinery & Equipment 0 0 0 0  162 
Total 468 472 521 1461  994 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with Investment Climate Surveys (ICs) data. 
 
 
Table 5: Total number of observations used in the IC regressions by year and 
industry 
 
A. Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua 
  2001 2002 Total 
Apparel  71 191 262 
Food/ Tobacco 12 32 44 
Beverages 52 111 163 
Chemical/Rubber 103 201 304 
Furniture/ Wood 90 219 309 
Leather/ Shoes 15 36 51 
Nonmetallic minerals 44 105 149 
Textiles 8 30 38 
Metal Products  45 95 140 
Total 440 1020 1460 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with Investment Climate Surveys (ICs) data. 
 
B. Costa Rica 
  2002 2003 2004 Total 
Food & beverages 43 44 45 132 
Textiles 21 21 22 64 
Apparels 35 38 38 111 
Wood & furniture 47 48 50 145 
Paper & edition 42 43 43 128 
Chemicals, rubber & plastics 49 49 50 148 
Non-metallic products 34 34 36 104 
Machinery & Equipment-Metallic 
products 
52 54 56 162 
Total 323 331 340 994 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with Investment Climate Surveys (ICs) data. 
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Table 6: Correlation matrix among productivity measures: Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua 
 
    Two steps Single step Restricted Single step Unrestricted 
    Solow’s Residual  Cobb Douglas Translog Cobb Douglas Translog 
    Restr. Unrestr. OLS RE OLS RE OLS RE OLS RE 
Two steps Restricted Solow's residual 1                   
Unrestricted Solow's residual 0.94 1                 
Single step 
Restricted 
Cobb Douglas OLS 0.93 0.99 1               
Cobb Douglas RE 0.91 0.98 0.98 1             
Translog OLS 0.87 0.93 0.94 0.92 1           
Translog RE 0.87 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.98 1         
Single step 
Unrestricted 
Cobb Douglas OLS 0.69 0.63 0.63 0.61 0.58 0.58 1       
Cobb Douglas RE 0.63 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.56 0.58 0.90 1     
Translog OLS 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.33 0.21 0.28 0.23 0.40 1   
Translog RE 0.14 0.20 0.21 0.26 0.17 0.21 -0.13 0.08 0.83 1 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with Investment Climate Surveys (ICs) data. 
NOTES: 
a)  Solow residuals in levels are obtained as sales (in logarithms or logs) minus a weighted average of labor, materials, capital (all in logs) where the weights are given by the share in total costs of each of the inputs.  
(1)    Restricted case: the cost shares are calculated as the averages of the plant-level cost shares across the entire sample in 2001 and 2002. 
(2)    Unrestricted by Industry case: the cost shares are calculated as the averages across plant-level cost shares in years 2001 and 2002. for each of the nine industries. 
(3)    Outlier plants were defined as those which had ratios of materials to sales larger than one or had ratios of labor costs to sales larger than one. 
b)  Estimated Productivity in levels is obtained from Cobb-Douglas and Translog production functions of sales with inputs labor, materials, and capital estimated by OLS and random effects under two different 
environments: 
(1)    Restricted: a single set of production function coefficients is obtained using data on plants in the three countries, for all industries in years 2001 and 2002 (excluding outliers). 
(2)    Unrestricted by Industry: a set of production function coefficients is obtained for each of nine industries using data on all plants for the three countries in years 2001 and 2002 (excluding outliers). 
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Table 7: Correlation matrix among productivity measures: Costa Rica 
 
    Two steps Single step Restricted Single step Unrestricted 
    Solow’s Residual  Cobb Douglas Translog Cobb Douglas Translog 
    Restr. Unrestr. OLS RE OLS RE OLS RE OLS RE 
Two steps Restricted Solow's residual 1                   
Unrestricted Solow's residual 0.99 1                 
Single step 
Restricted 
Cobb Douglas OLS 0.99 0.98 1               
Cobb Douglas RE 0.95 0.93 0.97 1             
Translog OLS 0.92 0.91 0.93 0.91 1           
Translog RE 0.91 0.90 0.94 0.95 0.98 1         
Single step 
Unrestricted 
Cobb Douglas OLS 0.34 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.34 0.35 1       
Cobb Douglas RE 0.36 0.38 0.38 0.40 0.37 0.38 0.97 1     
Translog OLS 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.24 0.21 1   
Translog RE 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.40 0.36 0.95 1 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with Investment Climate Surveys (ICs) data. 
NOTES: 
a)  Solow residuals in levels are obtained as sales (in logarithms or logs) minus a weighted average of labor, materials, capital (all in logs) where the weights are given by the share in total costs of each of the inputs.  
(1)    Restricted case: the cost shares are calculated as the averages of the plant-level cost shares across the entire sample in 2002, 2003 and 2004. 
(2)    Unrestricted by Industry case: the cost shares are calculated as the averages across plant-level cost shares in years 2002, 2003 and 2004 for each of the nine industries. 
(3)    Outlier plants were defined as those which had ratios of materials to sales larger than one or had ratios of labor costs to sales larger than one. 
b)  Estimated Productivity in levels is obtained from Cobb-Douglas and Translog production functions of sales with inputs labor, materials, and capital estimated by OLS and random effects under two different 
environments: 
(1)    Restricted: a single set of production function coefficients is obtained using data on plants in the three countries, for all industries in years 2002, 2003 and 2004 (excluding outliers). 
(2)    Unrestricted by Industry: a set of production function coefficients is obtained for each of nine industries using data on all plants for the three countries in years 2002, 2003 and 2004 (excluding outliers). 
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Table 8: Production Function Parameters from the Restricted Estimation 
 
A. Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua 
  
Labor 
(L) 
Materials 
(M) 
Capital 
(K) L2 M2 K2  L*M L*K M*K 
Cost-shares 0.36 0.53 0.11             
Cobb-Douglas controlling for IC variables 
Pool OLS 0.43*** 0.52*** 0.07*** - - - - - - 
RE 0.48*** 0.45*** 0.07*** - - - - - - 
Test for CRS   OLS Prob > F = 0.316    RE Prob > chi2 = 0.636   
Translog controlling for IC variables 
Pool OLS 1.21** 0.05 -0.09 0.06** 0.04*** 0.02*** 
-
0.10*** -0.01 -0.02 
RE 1.18*** 0.07 -0.19** -0.04*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 
-
0.07*** -0.02 -0.00 
Test for CRS  OLS Prob > F = 0.619 RE Prob > F = 0.543   
Test for Cobb-Douglas OLS Prob > chi2 = 0.012 RE Prob > chi2 = 0.000   
 
B. Costa Rica 
  
Labor 
(L) 
Materials 
(M) 
Capital 
(K) L2 M2 K2  L*M L*K M*K 
Cost-shares 0.33 0.56 0.11             
Cobb-Douglas 
Controlling for IC variables: 
Pool OLS 0.31*** 0.53*** 0.12*** - - - - - - 
RE 0.29*** 0.47*** 0.12*** - - - - - - 
Test for CRS   OLS Prob > F = 0.0649    RE Prob > chi2 = 0.0001   
Other estimation methods without controlling for IC variables: 
FE(a) 0.10*** 0.33*** 0.07*** - - - - - - 
A.C.F.(b) 0.29*** 0.67*** 0.09*** - - - - - - 
LP(c) 0.26*** 0.32*** 0.08***       
Translog controlling for IC variables 
Pool OLS 0.45** 0.92*** -0.30*** -0.02 0.06*** 0.02*** -0.06** 0.09*** -0.09*** 
RE 0.37 0.70*** -0.23 -0.02 0.05*** 0.02** -0.05 0.07** -0.08*** 
Test for CRS  OLS Prob > F = 0.0001   RE  Prob > F = 0.0001     
Test for Cobb-Douglas OLS Prob > chi2 = 0.000 RE Prob > chi2 = 0.0000     
Source: Authors’ elaboration with Investment Climate Surveys (ICs) data. 
NOTES: 
(a) Fixed effect estimation. 
(b) Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer’s (2007) procedure using the GMM estimation method of Wooldridge (2005) without IC 
variables. 
(c) Levinsohn and Petrin’s (2003) estimation procedure. 
 
(1) Significance is given by robust standard errors.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
(2) The cost shares of labor, materials and capital are calculated as average (excluding outliers) of the plant-level cost shares 
of labor, materials and capital across all plants in years 2001 and 2002 (Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua) and  2002, 
2003 and 2004 (Costa Rica). 
(3) The sample generating the sets of production function coefficients is constituted by all plants (excluding outliers) in 
years 2001 and 2002 (Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua) and 2002, 2003, and 2004 (Costa Rica). 
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Table 9.a: Production Function Parameters from the Unrestricted Estimation by 
Industry, Cobb-Douglas specification: Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua 
 
  
Coefficients Labor Materials Capital 
Test for Constant 
Returns to Scale 
Apparel Cost-share 0.42 0.47 0.11   
  Pool OLS 0.41*** 0.45*** 0.11*** Prob>F=0.5621 
  RE 0.42*** 0.44** 0.09*** Prob > chi2 = 0.0792 
Food and Tobacco Cost-share 0.27 0.64 0.09   
  Pool OLS 0.56 0.38 0.10 Prob>F=0.5594 
  RE 0.53 0.40** 0.10 Prob > chi2 =0.8349 
Beverages Cost-share 0.34 0.59 0.07   
  Pool OLS 0.44 0.52 0.14 Prob>F=0.0884 
  RE 0.62*** 0.33** 0.17 Prob > chi2 =0.0240 
Chemical and Rubber Cost-share 0.35 0.53 0.11   
  Pool OLS 0.55 0.48 0.05 Prob>F=0.0032 
  RE 0.68** 0.34** 0.06 Prob > chi2 = 0.0082 
Furniture and Wood Cost-share 0.34 0.54 0.12   
  Pool OLS 0.23* 0.70*** 0.01*** Prob>F=0.2493 
  RE 0.24 0.70 0.00*** Prob > chi2 =0.1938 
Leather and Shoes Cost-share 0.37 0.51 0.12   
  Pool OLS 0.88 0.28 0.08 Prob>F=0.0462 
  RE 0.79 0.29 0.08 Prob > chi2 = 0.2394 
Nonmetallic minerals Cost-share 0.32 0.56 0.11   
  Pool OLS 0.36 0.55 0.11 Prob>F=0.727 
  RE 0.48 0.44 0.11 Prob > chi2 = 0.6256 
Textiles Cost-share 0.34 0.53 0.13   
  Pool OLS 0.43 0.41 0.18 Prob>F=0.7727 
  RE 0.50 0.36 0.15 Prob > chi2 = 0.8509 
Metal Products Cost-share 0.37 0.52 0.12   
  Pool OLS 0.32 0.56* 0.06 Prob>F=0.2982 
  RE 0.38 0.51 0.06 Prob > chi2 = 0.3733 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with Investment Climate Surveys (ICs) data. 
NOTES: 
(1)  Significance is given by robust standard errors. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
(2)  The cost shares of labor, materials and capital are calculated as averages of the plant-level cost shares of labor, materials and 
capital for each industry using all plants for years 2002, 2003 and 2004 (excluding outliers). 
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Table 9.b: Production Function Parameters from the Unrestricted Estimation by 
Industry, Cobb-Douglas specification: Costa Rica 
 
  
Coefficients Labor Materials Capital 
Test for Constant 
Returns to Scale 
Food & beverages  Cost-share 0.24 0.64 0.12   
Pool OLS 0.43*** 0.33*** 0.26*** Prob>F=0.646 
RE 0.53*** 0.23*** 0.22*** Prob > chi2 = 0.652 
Textiles Cost-share 0.29 0.61 0.1   
Pool OLS 0.49 0.29 0.18 Prob>F=0.726 
RE 0.42 0.30 0.18 Prob > chi2 =0.18 
Apparels Cost-share 0.43 0.47 0.1   
Pool OLS 0.16*** 0.64*** 0.06*** Prob>F=0.068 
RE 0.11*** 0.68*** 0.01** Prob > chi2 =0.000 
Wood & furniture Cost-share 0.38 0.54 0.08   
Pool OLS 0.05*** 0.53*** 0.14** Prob>F=0.000 
RE 0.18** 0.44* 0.13 Prob > chi2 = 0.0005 
Paper & edition Cost-share 0.36 0.51 0.12   
Pool OLS 0.33 0.58*** 0.08* Prob>F=0.156 
RE 0.40 0.55*** 0.05* Prob > chi2 =0.000 
Chemicals, rubber & 
plastics 
Cost-share 0.26 0.63 0.11   
Pool OLS 0.21*** 0.49*** 0.16* Prob>F=0.012 
RE 0.26** 0.52*** 0.11* Prob > chi2 = 0.723 
Non-metallic products Cost-share 0.31 0.58 0.1   
Pool OLS 0.39 0.55*** 0.05*** Prob>F=0.318 
RE 0.26 0.60*** 0.04** Prob > chi2 = 0.009 
Machinery & 
Equipment  - Metallic 
products  
Cost-share 0.36 0.51 0.13   
Pool OLS 0.37 0.50*** 0.10*** Prob>F=0.259 
RE 0.22** 0.54*** 0.16 Prob > chi2 = 0.354 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with Investment Climate Surveys (ICs) data. 
NOTES: 
(1)  Significance is given by robust standard errors. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
(2)  The cost shares of labor, materials and capital are calculated as averages of the plant-level cost shares of labor, materials and 
capital for each industry using all plants for years 2002, 2003 and 2004 (excluding outliers). 
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Table 10.a: Production Function Parameters from the Unrestricted Estimation by Industry, Translog specification: Guatemala, 
Honduras, and Nicaragua  
  L M K L2 M2 K2 L*M L*K M*K Test for CD1 Test for CRS1 
Apparel                       
Pool OLS 0.90*** -0.30 0.30 0.06** 0.11*** 0.03** -0.17*** 0.07** -0.10*** 0.000 0.005 
RE 0.70** -0.28 0.42*** 0.03 0.11*** 0.02** -0.14*** 0.09*** -0.10*** 0.000 0.000 
Food and Tobacco                       
Pool OLS 0.80 -1.10** 0.85 -0.01 0.06 -0.10** -0.20 0.16 0.09** 0.000 0.071 
RE 1.01 -0.88** 0.67 0.00 0.05 -0.08* -0.17 0.10 0.08*** 0.087 0.517 
Beverages                       
Pool OLS 0.62 0.65 0.76 0.08 0.06** 0.01 -0.11 0.04 -0.09 0.000 0.113 
RE 0.76 0.63 0.76* 0.10 0.06** 0.01 -0.13 0.04 -0.08 0.000 0.035 
Chemical and Rubber                       
Pool OLS 1.99 -0.35 -0.50* 0.10 0.04* 0.03 -0.11 -0.08** 0.01*** 0.004 0.018 
RE 1.96 -0.52 -0.54 0.09*** 0.03*** 0.02 -0.06*** -0.11* 0.04*** 0.000 0.142 
Furniture and wood                       
Pool OLS 1.24* 0.42* -0.02 0.09 0.00*** -0.01** -0.07 -0.07** 0.04*** 0.357 0.033 
RE 1.53 0.10*** -0.19 0.08** -0.01*** -0.01** -0.05* -0.11*** 0.07*** 0.002 0.738 
Leather and shoes                       
Pool OLS 0.15 0.57 1.59*** 0.18 0.12 0.00 -0.22 0.18 -0.19 0.000 0.000 
RE -0.28 0.97 1.39 0.12 0.08 0.01 -0.13 0.15 -0.18 0.159 0.774 
Non metallic minerals                       
Pool OLS 0.74 -0.39 0.47 -0.04* 0.09 0.01 -0.07* 0.05 -0.07 0.001 0.092 
RE 0.36 -0.21 0.39 -0.01 0.08 0.02 -0.05 0.05 -0.07 0.019 0.490 
Textiles                       
Pool OLS 5.41* -2.64*** -1.41 0.16 0.21** 0.10 -0.37** -0.13 -0.05 0.000 0.142 
RE 3.76 -1.38 -1.37 0.06 0.15 0.12 -0.22 -0.09 -0.09 0.007 0.824 
Metal Products                       
Pool OLS 1.64 0.11 0.01 0.19 0.05* 0.02 -0.17 -0.04* -0.02* 0.017 0.081 
RE 1.35 -0.11 0.28 0.15 0.07 0.00 -0.19 0.03 -0.03* 0.198 0.174 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with Investment Climate Surveys (ICs) data. 
NOTES:  1 p-values. 
Significance is given by robust standard errors. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.. 
The cost shares of labor, materials and capital are calculated as averages of the plant-level cost shares of labor, materials and capital for each industry using all  plants for  years 2002, 2003 and 2004 (excluding 
outliers). 
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Table 10.b: Production Function Parameters from the Unrestricted Estimation by Industry, Translog specification: Costa Rica 
  L M K L2 M2 K2 L*M L*K M*K Test for CD1 Test for CRS1 
Food & Beverages                       
Pool OLS 0.56 1.03*** 0.00 -0.03 0.06*** -0.03** -0.11*** 0.16*** -0.06** 0.000 0.000 
RE 0.10 1.18*** 0.00 -0.01 0.07*** -0.04** -0.12*** 0.17*** -0.07** 0.000 0.000 
Textiles                       
Pool OLS -1.32*** 1.19 0.70*** 0.17*** 0.08* 0.01* -0.17 0.004** -0.07 0.000 0.000 
RE -1.11 1.03 0.15 0.14** 0.09 0.01* -0.17 0.03** -0.06 0.000 0.199 
Apparels                       
Pool OLS 1.43 1.69* -1.12*** -0.16*** 0.05 0.03** -0.04* 0.25 -0.18*** 0.000 0.000 
RE 1.05 1.63 -1.18*** -0.15*** 0.02** 0.01* -0.01** 0.24 -0.14 0.000 0.007 
Wood & furniture                       
Pool OLS 0.13 0.04* 0.25 -0.17* 0.003* -0.04 0.17** 0.18 -0.11 0.033 0.000 
RE 0.17 -0.60** 0.26 -0.09 0.05 -0.02 0.09 0.10 -0.08 0.008 0.000 
Paper & edition                       
Pool OLS 0.71 1.21 -0.17 0.01 0.02 0.02* -0.07 0.02* -0.03 0.083 0.425 
RE 0.17 1.96 -0.54* 0.09 0.05 0.06*** -0.16 0.005*** -0.07 0.015 0.320 
Chemicals, rubber & plastics                       
Pool OLS 0.92 0.32* 0.08 -0.05 0.04 -0.01 -0.03 0.06** -0.03 0.000 0.008 
RE 0.88 0.51 -0.24 -0.07 0.02* 0.003** 0.01* 0.07** -0.04 0.004 0.047 
Non-metallic Products                       
Pool OLS 0.18 0.73 0.06 0.11* 0.1 0.04** -0.18 -0.04** -0.04 0.000 0.269 
RE -0.43 0.5 1.18 0.12 0.01 -0.04 -0.07 -0.09** 0.06 0.322 0.088 
Mach. & Equip. – Metallic Prod.                       
Pool OLS 0.72 1.32 -0.72*** 0.03 0.06 0.00* -0.17 0.09 -0.02 0.000 0.000 
RE 0.41 0.7 -0.21 0.03 0.04 -0.01 -0.12 0.04* -0.02* 0.054 0.004 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with Investment Climate Surveys (ICs) data. 
NOTES:  1 p-values. 
Significance is given by robust standard errors. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
The cost shares of labor, materials and capital are calculated as averages of the plant-level cost shares of labor, materials and capital for each industry using all  plants for  years 2002, 2003 and 2004 (excluding 
outliers). 
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Table 11: Estimation of IC elasticities and semi-elasticities on productivity controlling for observable fixed effects: Guatemala, 
Honduras, and Nicaragua 
 
  
Blocas of IC 
variables 
  
Explanatory IC variables 
Restricted estimation Unrestricted by industry estimation 
Two steps  Single step  Two steps  Single step  
Solow residual Cobb-Douglas Translog Solow residual Cobb-Douglas Translog 
OLS R.E OLS R.E OLS R.E OLS R.E OLS R.E OLS R.E 
Infrastruc-
tures 
Average duration of power outages Hours per 
day (logs) (AV) 
-0.078* -0.066 -0.079* -0.087 -0.073* -0.07 -0.082* -0.071 -0.055 -0.059 -0.026 -0.03 
Average number of days to clear customs for 
imports (logs) (AV) 
-0.101*** -0.099*** -0.103*** -0.093** -0.114*** -0.111*** -0.098*** -0.096** -0.100** -0.095** -0.096*** -0.096** 
Shipment Losses (Fraction of total sales) 
(AV) 
-1.588** -1.15 -1.766** -0.981 -1.289* -0.565 -1.553* -1.107 -2.078** -1.513 -1.934** -1.296 
Dummy for Internet Access (0 or 1) 0.145*** 0.136*** 0.147*** 0.187*** 0.121*** 0.163*** 0.153*** 0.144*** 0.130*** 0.178*** 0.112*** 0.144*** 
Red tape, 
corruption 
and crime 
Number of days spent in Inspection and 
Regulation related work Days (logs) (AV) 
-0.131*** -0.133*** -0.135*** -0.139*** -0.099*** -0.114*** -0.131*** -0.132*** -0.123*** -0.137*** -0.078** -0.091** 
Fraction of sales declared to IRS for tax 
purposes (Fraction of total sales) (AV) 
-0.302 -0.305 -0.268 -0.404 -0.324 -0.486* -0.249 -0.246 -0.38 -0.404 -0.417* -0.417 
Number of criminal attempts suffered 
(Number) (AV) 
-0.026** -0.027** -0.024** -0.025* -0.01 -0.012 -0.024** -0.026** -0.024** -0.02 -0.001 -0.005 
Finance and 
corp. gov. 
Dummy for external audit of financial 
statements (0 or 1) 
0.177*** 0.168*** 0.164*** 0.193*** 0.126*** 0.145*** 0.176*** 0.168*** 0.153*** 0.181*** 0.086** 0.099** 
Quality, 
innovation 
and labor 
skills 
Fraction computer-controlled machinery of 
total machinery (Fraction of total machinery) 
0.136* 0.169* 0.147* 0.220** 0.145* 0.179* 0.139* 0.172* 0.154* 0.223** 0.138* 0.168* 
Fraction of total staff engaged in R & D 
(Fraction of total staff) 
0.534* 0.473* 0.620** 0.591* 0.545** 0.603** 0.537* 0.479* 0.551** 0.506 0.468* 0.484* 
Dummy for ISO quality certif. (0 or 1) 0.136 0.166* 0.158 0.196* 0.016 0.053 0.149 0.176* 0.17 0.192* 0.068 0.054 
Fraction of total staff with secondary 
education or more (Fraction of total staff) 
0.05 0.085 0.068 0.129* 0.053 0.117* 0.054 0.088 0.069 0.134* 0.076 0.142** 
Dummy for training provided beyond "on the 
job" (0 or 1) 
0.117*** 0.116*** 0.105*** 0.136*** 0.087*** 0.112*** 0.119*** 0.117*** 0.109*** 0.133*** 0.102*** 0.118*** 
Other control 
variables 
Dummy for Incorporated Company (0 or 1) 0.121*** 0.124*** 0.112*** 0.142*** 0.093** 0.120*** 0.124*** 0.127*** 0.103*** 0.119** 0.100*** 0.109** 
Age of the firm years (logs) 0.038** 0.040* 0.035* 0.044* 0.035** 0.041* 0.037* 0.039* 0.030* 0.033 0.030* 0.037* 
Share of Imported inputs (Fraction of total 
inputs) 
0.105** 0.108** 0.093* 0.129** 0.086* 0.116** 0.108** 0.110** 0.068 0.099* 0.067 0.076 
  Observations 1461 1461 1461 1461 1461 1461 1461 1461 1461 1461 1461 1461 
R-squared 0.25 0.25 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.19 0.19 0.92 0.92 0.94 0.94 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with Investment Climate Surveys (ICs) data. 
NOTES: (AV) means that the variable enters the regression in form of industry-region average. Significance is given by robust standard errors (very similar results by robust cluster errors). * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The regressions include a constant, industry dummies and year dummies. 
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Table 12: Estimation of IC elasticities and semi-elasticities on productivity controlling for observable fixed effects: Costa Rica 
 
  
Block of IC 
variables 
  
Explanatory ICA variables 
Restricted Unrestricted by industry 
Two steps estimation Single step estimation Two steps estimation Single step estimation 
Solow residual Cobb-Douglas Translog Solow residual Cobb-Douglas Translog 
OLS R.E OLS R.E OLS R.E OLS R.E OLS R.E OLS R.E 
Infrastruc-
tures 
Average no. of days to clear customs for exports (logs) (AV) -0.077** -0.083 -0.076** -0.066 -0.072** -0.059 -0.089** -0.095* -0.076* -0.072 -0.044 -0.048 
Average duration of power outages. Hrs. per day (logs) (AV) -0.027*** -0.026 -0.029*** -0.032* -0.017** -0.019 -0.027*** -0.026 -0.030*** -0.031* -0.022** -0.033* 
Total number of water outages (logs) (AV) -0.233*** -0.244* -0.217*** -0.181 -0.121** -0.113 -0.237** -0.247 -0.207*** -0.181 -0.220*** -0.204** 
Average days waiting for an electricity supply (logs) (AV) -0.130*** -0.135*** -0.128*** -0.134*** -0.089*** -0.094** -0.118*** -0.124*** -0.106*** -0.120** -0.054* -0.055 
Red tape, 
corruption 
and crime 
Percentage of sales declared to IRS for tax purposes (% of total 
sales) (AV) 
0.011*** 0.011** 0.010*** 0.008** 0.005*** 0.004* 0.010*** 0.010** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.006*** 0.005** 
Number of days spent in Inspection and Regulation related work 
Days (logs) 
-0.337*** -0.340*** -0.326*** -0.301*** -0.198*** -0.195** -0.346*** -0.346*** -0.326*** -0.346*** -0.281*** -0.311*** 
Dummy for payments to obtain a contract with the government (0 
or 1) (AV) 
0.393*** 0.427* 0.394*** 0.447* 0.177* 0.222 0.419*** 0.455* 0.240* 0.292 -0.118 0.041 
Percentage of sales never repaid (% of total sales) (AV) -0.015*** -0.015** -0.016*** -0.019*** -0.007* -0.011* -0.016*** -0.016* -0.014*** -0.018*** -0.002 -0.004 
Number of days lost due to absenteeism (logs) -0.042** -0.037 -0.042** -0.038 -0.034** -0.032 -0.046*** -0.04 -0.023 -0.021 -0.021 -0.027 
Finance and 
corporate 
governance 
Dummy for firm belonging to a trade assoc. (0 or 1) (AV) 0.446*** 0.468*** 0.447*** 0.455*** 0.412*** 0.373** 0.403*** 0.418** 0.568*** 0.560*** 0.480*** 0.409** 
Dummy for credit line (0 or 1) 0.052 0.047 0.070* 0.098 0.038 0.063 0.054 0.05 0.039 0.024 0.035 0.029 
Dummy for debts with creditors (0 or 1) (AV) 0.317* 0.377 0.276 0.294 0.032 0.119 0.276 0.338 0.330* 0.412 0.142 0.058 
Firm's profits after taxes as a percentage of total sales (% of total 
sales) (AV) 
0.019*** 0.019** 0.018*** 0.016* 0.009** 0.007 0.018*** 0.018* 0.014*** 0.013* 0.008 0.01 
Dummy for firm owning almost all the lands in which the plant 
operates (0 or 1) 
-0.164*** -0.156** -0.158*** -0.131* -0.146*** -0.121** -0.155*** -0.146** -0.158*** -0.129** -0.165*** -0.137** 
Quality, 
innovation 
and labor 
skills 
Dummy for ISO certification (0 or 1) 0.268*** 0.267*** 0.301*** 0.390*** 0.286*** 0.310*** 0.283*** 0.277*** 0.180*** 0.217* 0.192*** 0.237** 
Dummy for new technological license (0 or 1) (AV) 0.169 0.138 0.196* 0.254 0.111 0.156 0.211* 0.178 0.117 0.2 0.214* 0.380** 
Percentage computer-controlled machinery of total machinery (% 
of total machinery) 
0.002*** 0.002* 0.003*** 0.004** 0.002*** 0.003** 0.002** 0.002 0.002*** 0.003** 0.001* 0.003** 
Number of plant's employees dealing with engineering and design 
(logs) (AV) 
0.029*** 0.029* 0.031*** 0.035* 0.017 0.022 0.032*** 0.032* 0.017 0.023 0.001 0.018 
Percentage of immigrant workers (% of total staff) (AV) -0.133* -0.125 -0.133* -0.135 -0.069 -0.085 -0.172** -0.163 -0.023 -0.002 -0.065 -0.105 
Percentage of unskilled workers receiving training (% of 
unskilled workers) (AV) 
0.004 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.007** 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.007** 0.004 0.012*** 0.009* 
Percentage of staff using computer at job (% of total staff)  0.002* 0.002 0.002* 0.002 0.002** 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002** 0.002 0.003*** 0.001 
Other 
control 
variables 
Dummy for foreign direct investment (0 or 1) 0.138* 0.141 0.156* 0.198* 0.109 0.129 0.143* 0.146 0.183** 0.263** 0.07 0.118 
Number of competitors in plant's main market (logs) (AV) 0.126*** 0.117** 0.125*** 0.112** 0.120*** 0.109** 0.137*** 0.126** 0.107*** 0.088* 0.100*** 0.141*** 
Dummy for benefit from free trade agreements with signed by the 
government (0 or 1) 
0.083* 0.085 0.109** 0.188** 0.083 0.143* 0.056 0.059 0.095* 0.183** 0.116** 0.152* 
Percentage of capacity utilization (percentage) 0.003*** 0.003** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004** 
Dummy for importer firm (0 or 1) 0.180*** 0.176*** 0.220*** 0.315*** 0.212*** 0.276*** 0.187*** 0.184*** 0.191*** 0.270*** 0.186*** 0.234*** 
  Observations 985 985 985 985 985 985 985 985 985 985 985 985 
R2 0.29 0.29 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.27 0.27 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.96 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with Investment Climate Surveys (ICs) data. 
NOTES: (AV) means that the variable enters the regression in form of industry-region average. Significance is given by robust standard errors (very similar results by robust cluster errors). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. The regressions include a constant, industry dummies and year dummies. 
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Table 13: IC elasticities and semi-elasticities with respect to productivity without controlling for other IC variables: Guatemala, 
Honduras, and Nicaragua 
 
Blocas of IC 
variables 
Explanatory IC variables 
Restricted estimation Unrestricted by industry estimation 
Two steps  Single step  Two steps  Single step  
Solow residual Cobb-Douglas Translog Solow residual Cobb-Douglas Translog 
OLS R.E OLS R.E OLS R.E OLS R.E OLS R.E OLS R.E 
Infrastruc-
tures 
Average duration of power outages Hours per day (logs) (AV) -0.084** -0.076 -0.042 -0.071 -0.053 -0.069 -0.087** -0.079* -0.027 -0.047 -0.043 -0.054 
Average number of days to clear customs for imports (logs) (AV) -0.016 -0.015 -0.037 -0.011 -0.044 -0.027 -0.012 -0.011 -0.042 -0.021 -0.028 -0.018 
Shipment Losses (Fraction of total sales) (AV) 1.759** 2.310* 1.450* 2.377* 1.682** 2.602** 1.736** 2.280* 1.357 2.033 0.983 1.782 
Dummy for Internet Access (0 or 1) 0.311*** 0.302*** 0.217*** 0.279*** 0.181*** 0.232*** 0.321*** 0.311*** 0.202*** 0.265*** 0.173*** 0.206*** 
Red tape, 
corruption and 
crime 
Number of days spent in Inspection and Regulation related work Days (logs) (AV) -0.100*** -0.100*** -0.087*** -0.097*** -0.054** -0.075** -0.097*** -0.098*** -0.083*** -0.096*** -0.044* -0.058* 
Fraction of sales declared to IRS for tax purposes (Fraction of total sales) (AV) -0.759*** -0.765*** -0.441** -0.645*** -0.505*** -0.695*** -0.725*** -0.727*** -0.540*** -0.668*** -0.621*** -0.690*** 
Number of criminal attempts suffered (Number) (AV) -0.0004 -0.001 -0.013 -0.008 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.0004 -0.012 -0.007 0.009 0.007 
Fin. and Corp. 
Gov. 
Dummy for external audit of financial statements (0 or 1) 0.287*** 0.281*** 0.182*** 0.222*** 0.128*** 0.158*** 0.291*** 0.285*** 0.180*** 0.216*** 0.103*** 0.118*** 
Quality, 
innovation and 
labor skills 
Fraction computer-controlled machinery of total machinery (Fraction of total 
machinery) 
0.184** 0.242** 0.116 0.220** 0.122 0.174* 0.190** 0.250** 0.140* 0.234** 0.142* 0.187* 
Fraction of total staff engaged in R & D (Fraction of total staff) 0.421 0.356 0.774*** 0.805*** 0.606** 0.742*** 0.429 0.364 0.696*** 0.722** 0.605*** 0.682** 
Dummy for ISO quality certification (0 or 1) 0.288*** 0.317*** 0.196** 0.269*** 0.052 0.104 0.302*** 0.327*** 0.216** 0.268*** 0.12 0.118 
Fraction of total staff with secondary education or more (Fraction of total staff) 0.167*** 0.192*** 0.175*** 0.247*** 0.141** 0.215*** 0.173*** 0.197*** 0.164*** 0.238*** 0.149** 0.221*** 
Dummy for training provided beyond "on the job" (0 or 1) 0.218*** 0.214*** 0.125*** 0.169*** 0.105*** 0.135*** 0.224*** 0.219*** 0.128*** 0.161*** 0.127*** 0.146*** 
Dummy for Incorporated Company (0 or 1) 0.254*** 0.251*** 0.132*** 0.180*** 0.108*** 0.146*** 0.262*** 0.258*** 0.128*** 0.160*** 0.114*** 0.130*** 
Other control 
variables 
Age of the firm years (logs) 0.031* 0.029 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.023 0.031 0.028 0.021 0.019 0.029* 0.033 
Share of Imported inputs (Fraction of total inputs) 0.280*** 0.287*** 0.149*** 0.205*** 0.119*** 0.166*** 0.288*** 0.294*** 0.135*** 0.189*** 0.106** 0.134*** 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with Investment Climate Surveys (ICs) data. 
NOTES: (AV) means that the variable enters the regression in form of industry-region average. LIGHT GREY means that the variable changes in significance and magnitude with respect to the full estimation of Table 2. DARK GREY implies that it 
changes also the direction of the effect.  Significance is given by robust standard errors. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The regressions include a constant, industry dummies and year dummies. 
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Table 14: IC elasticities and semi-elasticities with respect to productivity without controlling for other IC variables: Costa Rica 
Blocas of IC 
variables 
Explanatory IC variables 
Restricted estimation Unrestricted by industry estimation 
Two steps  Single step  Two steps  Single step  
Solow residual Cobb-Douglas Translog Solow residual Cobb-Douglas Translog 
OLS R.E OLS R.E OLS R.E OLS R.E OLS R.E OLS R.E 
Infrastruc-
tures 
Average number of days to clear customs for exports (logs) (AV) -0.06 -0.066 -0.073** -0.071 -0.058* -0.06 -0.080** -0.085 -0.062 -0.074 -0.031 -0.052 
Average duration of power outages Hours per day (logs) (AV) -0.013** -0.012 -0.011 -0.013 -0.009 -0.013 -0.014** -0.013 -0.018*** -0.020** -0.014** -0.020** 
Total number of water outages (logs) (AV) -0.144** -0.156 -0.131** -0.146 -0.077** -0.095 -0.156** -0.167 -0.102* -0.118 -0.068 -0.087 
Average days waiting for an electricity supply (logs) (AV) -0.109*** -0.112** -0.108*** -0.117** -0.096*** -0.104** -0.101*** -0.103** -0.084*** -0.097** -0.077** -0.073* 
Red tape, 
corruption and 
crime 
Percentage of sales declared to IRS for tax purposes (% of total sales) (AV) 0.004** 0.004 0.004** 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.004** 0.004 0.004** 0.003 0.001 0.002 
Number of days spent in Inspection and Regulation related work Days (logs) -0.018 -0.018 -0.070* -0.014 -0.031 -0.005 -0.027 -0.026 -0.075* -0.054 -0.084** -0.086 
Dummy for payments to obtain a contract with the government (0 or 1) (AV) 0.156 0.18 0.143 0.185 0.02 0.05 0.185 0.21 0.053 0.134 -0.142 -0.044 
Percentage of sales never repaid (percentage of total sales) (AV) -0.015*** -0.015** -0.012** -0.018** -0.006 -0.012* -0.016*** -0.016** -0.011** -0.015** 0.002 -0.002 
Number of days lost due to absenteeism (logs) -0.026* -0.022 -0.024 -0.021 -0.014 -0.015 -0.032** -0.027 -0.007 -0.009 -0.005 -0.014 
Finance and 
corporate 
governance 
Dummy for firm belonging to a trade association (0 or 1) (AV) 0.351*** 0.366** 0.252*** 0.425** 0.265*** 0.307* 0.321*** 0.331* 0.251** 0.369** 0.14 0.168 
Dummy for credit line (0 or 1) 0.125*** 0.117* 0.083** 0.145** 0.051 0.093 0.126*** 0.118* 0.039 0.049 0.055 0.062 
Dummy for debts with creditors (0 or 1) (AV) 0.16 0.196 0.126 0.149 0.037 0.116 0.143 0.182 0.089 0.096 -0.015 -0.029 
Firm's profits after taxes as a percentage of total sales (% of total sales) (AV) 
-0.006** -0.005 -0.003 -0.006 -0.004 -0.008* -0.007** -0.007 -0.005 -0.008* -0.004 -0.007 
Dummy for firm owning almost all the lands in which the plant operates (0 or 1) -0.135*** -0.132** -0.182*** -0.152** -0.170*** -0.144** -0.120*** -0.117* -0.176*** -0.147** -0.190*** -0.154** 
Quality, 
innovation and 
labor skills 
Dummy for ISO certification (0 or 1) 0.549*** 0.545*** 0.502*** 0.707*** 0.427*** 0.513*** 0.549*** 0.542*** 0.394*** 0.518*** 0.387*** 0.423*** 
Dummy for new technological license (0 or 1) (AV) 0.198** 0.184 0.039 0.218 -0.004 (a) 0.109 0.207** 0.195 -0.039 (a) 0.147 -0.079 0.069 
Percentage computer-controlled machinery of total machinery (% of total machinery) 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 
Number of plant's employees dealing with engineering and design (logs) (AV) 
0.036*** 0.036* 0.028** 0.041* 0.020** 0.029 0.038*** 0.038* 0.017 0.03 0.003 0.012 
Percentage of immigrant workers (perc. of total staff) (AV) -0.256*** -0.258** -0.245*** -0.244** -0.166*** -0.188* -0.283*** -0.283** -0.124* -0.109 -0.109 -0.137 
Percentage of unskilled workers receiving training (perc. of unskilled workers) (AV) -0.001 (a) -0.002 (a) -0.001 (a) -0.003 (a) 0.002 0.001 -0.002 (a) -0.002 (a) 0.001 -0.001 (a) 0.004** 0.003 
Percentage of staff using computer at job (perc. of total staff)  0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
Other control 
variables 
Dummy for foreign direct investment (0 or 1) 0.395*** 0.387*** 0.312*** 0.464*** 0.225*** 0.297*** 0.393*** 0.384*** 0.297*** 0.467*** 0.196*** 0.279** 
Total number of competitors in plant's main market (logs) (AV) 0.021 0.018 0.027 0.009 0.044 0.034 0.023 0.019 0.032 -0.001 0.019 0.022 
Dummy for benefit from free trade agreements with signed by the government (0 or 
1) 
0.268*** 0.264*** 0.197*** 0.337*** 0.144** 0.228*** 0.246*** 0.242*** 0.141** 0.276*** 0.184*** 0.239*** 
Percentage of capacity utilization (percentage) 0.003*** 0.003** 0.003*** 0.004** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003** 
Dummy for importer firm (0 or 1) 0.308*** 0.303*** 0.277*** 0.445*** 0.246*** 0.344*** 0.310*** 0.304*** 0.248*** 0.380*** 0.259*** 0.317*** 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with Investment Climate Surveys (ICs) data. 
NOTES: (AV) means that the variable enters the regression in form of industry-region average. Significance is given by robust standard errors. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The regressions include a constant, 
industry dummies and year dummies. LIGHT GREY means that the variable changes in significance and magnitude with respect to the full estimation of Table 2. DARK GREY implies that it changes also the direction of the effect.  (a) The variable 
changes the direction of the effect, although statistically insignificant. 
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Table 15: Further robustness: Costa Rica 
 
Blocks of IC 
variables 
Explanatory IC variables 
Restricted 
Solow 
Residual; 
Cost-Shares 
Levinsohn 
and Petrin  
A.C.F (2007) 
(5) 
Infrastruc-
tures 
Average number of days to clear customs for exports (logs) (AV) -0.077** -0.009 -0.082* 
Average duration of power outages Hours per day (logs) (AV) -0.027*** -0.044*** -0.023* 
Total number of water outages (logs) (AV) -0.233*** -0.064 -0.301** 
Average days waiting for an electricity supply (logs) (AV) -0.130*** -0.137*** -0.121*** 
Red tape, 
corruption 
and crime 
Percentage of sales declared to IRS for tax purposes (Percentage 
of total sales) (AV) 
0.011*** 0.004 0.012*** 
Number of days spent in Inspection and Regulation related work 
Days (logs) 
-0.337*** -0.235*** -0.359*** 
Dummy for payments to obtain a contract with the government (0 
or 1) (AV) 
0.393*** 0.492*** 0.342* 
Percentage of sales never repaid (percentage of total sales) (AV) -0.015*** -0.026*** -0.011** 
Number of days lost due to absenteeism (logs) -0.042** -0.045** -0.042* 
Finance and 
corporate 
governance 
Dummy for firm belonging to a trade association (0 or 1) (AV) 0.446*** 0.403*** 0.440*** 
Dummy for credit line (0 or 1) 0.052 0.177*** 0.024 
Dummy for debts with creditors (0 or 1) (AV) 0.317* 0.228 0.398 
Firm's profits after taxes as a percentage of total sales (perc. of 
total sales) (AV) 
0.019*** 0.012** 0.019** 
Dummy for firm owning almost all the lands in which the plant 
operates (0 or 1) 
-0.164*** -0.063 -0.157*** 
Quality, 
innovation 
and labor 
skills 
Dummy for ISO certification (0 or 1) 0.268*** 0.611*** 0.188** 
Dummy for new technological license (0 or 1) (AV) 0.169 0.536*** 0.089 
Percentage computer-controlled machinery of total machinery 
(perc. of total machinery) 
0.002*** 0.007*** 0.002* 
Number of plant's employees dealing with engineering and design 
(logs) (AV) 
0.029*** 0.044*** 0.025* 
Percentage of immigrant workers (perc. of total staff) (AV) -0.133* -0.155 -0.149 
Percentage of unskilled workers receiving training (perc. of 
unskilled workers) (AV) 
0.004 -0.002 0.007* 
Percentage of staff using computer at job (perc. of total staff)  0.002* 0.002 0.001 
Other control 
variables 
Dummy for foreign direct investment (0 or 1) 0.138* 0.342*** 0.121 
Total number of competitors in plant's main market (logs) (AV) 0.126*** 0.107** 0.135*** 
Dummy for benefit from free trade agreements with signed by the 
government (0 or 1) 
0.083* 0.411*** 0.033 
Percentage of capacity utilization (percentage) 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.002* 
Dummy for importer firm (0 or 1) 0.180*** 0.569*** 0.093* 
  Observations 985 985 985 
R
2
 0.29 0.58 0.20 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with Investment Climate Surveys (ICs) data. 
NOTES:  
(1) (AV) means that the variable enters the regression in form of industry-region average. 
(2) Significance is given by robust standard errors. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
(3) Two steps estimation, inputs elasticities restricted by industry. 
(4) The regressions include a constant, industry dummies and year dummies. 
(5) Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer’s (2007) GMM estimation method of Wooldridge (2005) without IC variables. 
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Figure 1: Decomposition of per capita income from 1950 to 2004: Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica 
 
(a) Real Gross Domestic Product per capita (Relative to US) 
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(b) Real Gross Domestic Product per worker (Relative to US) 
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(c) Labor force participation (Relative to US) 
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Figure 2: Kernel density of productivity measures: Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with Investment Climate Surveys (ICs) data. 
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Figure 3: Kernel density of productivity measures: Costa Rica 
 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with Investment Climate Surveys (ICs) data. 
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Figure 4: IC and C elasticities and semi-elasticities with respect to productivity: Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with Investment Climate Surveys (ICs) data. 
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Figure 5: IC and C elasticities and semi-elasticities with respect to productivity: Costa Rica 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with Investment Climate Surveys (ICs) data. 
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Figure 6: Relative IC effects to average log productivity: Guatemala, Honduras, 
and Nicaragua 
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(b) Honduras 
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(c) Nicaragua 
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T.1 Total infrastructures
1.1 Average duration of power outage. Hrs. per 
day.
1.2 Average number of days to clear customs 
for imports
1.3 Shipment losses
1.4 Dummy for internet acsess
T.2 Total red tape corruption and crime
2.1 Number of days spent in inspection and 
regulation related work
2.2 Fraction of sales declared to IRS for tax 
purposes
2.3 Number of criminal attemps suffered
T.3 Total finance and corporate 
governance
3.1  External audit of financial statements
T.4 Total quality, innovation and labor 
skills
4.1  Fraction computer-controlled machinery
4.2 Fraction of total staff engaged in R&D
4.3 ISO quality certification
4.4 Fraction of total staff with secondary 
education or more
4.5 Training provided beyond "on the job"
T.5 Total other control variables
5.1  Dummy incorporated company
5.2 Age of the firm
5.3 Share of imported
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Figure 7: Relative IC effects to average log productivity: Costa Rica 
 
3.1 3.2 2.5
10.4
21.9
10.3
3.1
1.6 0.8
5.9
0.7
6.7
8.6
3.4
0.7 1.7
1.9
0.5 0.5 0.4
7.9
0.5
2.0
19.2
25.3
7.2
10.7
1.00.8
37.8
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
40.0
T.1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 T.2 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 T.3 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 T.4 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 T.5 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4
T.1 Total infrastructures
1.1 Days to clear customs for exports
1.2 Average duration of power outages
1.3 Water outages
1.4 Wait for electric supply
T.2 Total red tape, corr. and crime
2.1 Sales declared to taxes
2.2 Number of inspections
2.3 Payments to obtain a contract with the gov.
2.4 Sales never repaid
2.5 Absenteeism
4.4 Design and engineering
4.5 Immigrant workers
4.6 Training to unskilled workers
4.7 Staff with computer 
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5.3 Trade agreements
5.4 Importer
%
T.3 Total finance and corporate gov.
3.1 Trade association
3.2 Credit line
3.3 Debts with creditors
3.4 Profit
3.5 Owner of the lands
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4.2 New technological license
4.3 Computer controlled machinery
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